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While state drug law reform is moving apace, federal drug law reform has 
moved much more slowly. Many, including the Judicial Conference of the 
United States and the United States Sentencing Commission, have urged 
Congress to enact substantive federal drug law reform for years. But 
Congress has not acted. As a result, the federal system continues to single 
out drug offenses for harsh treatment at the bail stage and the sentencing 
stage—the front end and back end of the federal mass incarceration crisis. 
In this paper, we argue that federal judges have a critical role to play in 
future federal drug law reform in light of Congress’ long-standing failures 
to meaningfully change the laws. At the front end, judges should 
encourage the release of more people on bail by closely scrutinizing 
prosecutors’ motions for temporary detention and giving little weight to 
the Bail Reform Act’s presumption of detention. Data shows that the 
statutory drug presumption is overbroad and does a poor job of 
determining who is a risk of flight or a danger to the community. At the 
back end, judges should issue categorical policy disagreements with the 
drug sentencing guidelines and the career offender sentencing guideline 
using the Supreme Court’s blueprint in Kimbrough v. United States. 
Judges should issue sentences below these guidelines because they are not 
based on empirical evidence, over-punish drug offenses, and result in 
racial disparities. At both ends, judges should rest their decisions on the 
evidence that the drug presumption, the drug sentencing guidelines, and 
the career offender sentencing guideline are flawed. While judicial action 
is not a cure for Congressional inaction, it would send a clear message 
from one co-equal branch of government to another that substantive 
reform is urgently needed.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
From progressive prosecutors diverting drug cases out of the criminal legal 
system to the elimination of mandatory minimums and three strikes laws, drug law 
reform in the states is having a moment. Some have even gone so far as to suggest 
that the War on Drugs is coming to an end.1 Federal drug law reform has moved 
much more slowly.2 To be sure, there has been modest progress. In late 2018, 
President Donald Trump signed the First Step Act (“FSA”) into law—the most 
significant reform of our federal drug laws since Congress passed the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act in 1986 (“1986 Act”). Among other things, the FSA reduced the 
draconian recidivist enhancements for federal drug offenses, expanded the “safety 
valve” so judges have more latitude to sentence low-level, nonviolent drug offenders 
below the mandatory minimum,3 and mandated correctional reform and 
rehabilitative programming in the Bureau of Prisons.4  
While these reforms made some progress, they simply tinker around the edges 
and do not come close to ending the War on Drugs or solving the federal mass 
incarceration crisis. Many, including the Judicial Conference of the United States 
and the United States Sentencing Commission, have urged Congress to enact more 
sweeping reforms for years. But Congress has not acted. In the meantime, the federal 
system’s decades-long obsession with singling out people charged and convicted of 
drug offenses for harsh treatment continues. 
The federal system’s preoccupation with drug offenses has significant 
consequences at the bail stage and the sentencing stage—the front end and back end 
of the federal mass incarceration crisis.  
Federal law treats drug offenses harshly from the outset, starting at a person’s 
initial appearance before a federal judge. The Bail Reform Act (“BRA”)—passed at 
the height of the War on Drugs in the 1980s—allows prosecutors to move to 
temporarily detain almost anyone who is charged with a drug offense until a 
 
1    See Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1323, 1324 (2016) (describing efforts by  
President Barack Obama’s drug “czars” to retire the War on Drugs “concept”); Nicholas Kristof, 
Seattle Has Figured Out How to End the War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/opinion/sunday/opioid-crisis-drug-seattle.html.  
2    See, e.g., Kara Gotsch, Breakthrough in U.S. Drug Sentencing Reform: The Fair Sentencing 
Act and the Unfinished Reform Agenda, WOLA 1, 1 (Nov. 2011), https://www.wola.org/ 
sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/2011/FSA/WOLA_RPT_FSA-Eng_FNL-WEB.pdf. 
(“The Fair Sentencing Act was welcomed by civil rights and community activists, but the compromise 
measure fell short of the changes they had sought for two decades.”).  
3    The changes to the recidivist enhancements and the “safety valve” are prospective only and 
do not provide relief to those who were sentenced prior to the Act’s passage. First Step Act of 2018, 
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 756, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221 (2018).  
4    See id.  
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detention hearing.5 At the detention hearing, the BRA mandates a presumption that 
those same people be detained throughout the case based on dangerousness, even 
though they are presumed innocent.6 The BRA’s provisions favoring pretrial 
detention in drug cases are outdated relics of the War on Drugs and should be 
eliminated. Data shows that the drug presumption does not accurately predict which 
arrestees pose a flight risk or a danger to the community, the two pillars of the BRA. 
The federal judiciary has already voiced its opposition to the drug presumption, 
which alone should be a clarion call to judges to exercise their discretion to release 
people in presumption cases. In 2017, the Judicial Conference—chaired by Chief 
Justice John Roberts—urged Congress to eliminate the presumption of detention in 
most drug cases.7 The Judicial Conference reiterated this recommendation during 
the COVID-19 pandemic and issued a broader call for federal bail reform: “Legal, 
policy, and budgetary factors—including the presumption of innocence and the 
relative costs of incarceration versus pretrial supervision—support reducing 
unnecessary pretrial detention.”8 Congress’ inaction in the face of the judiciary’s 
repeated calls for reform makes it all the more imperative that judges use their 
discretion to counteract the unwarranted harshness of the presumption in drug cases. 
Federal law also treats drug offenses harshly at the sentencing stage. The 
majority of federal drug offenses carry mandatory minimum penalties that judges 
must impose—no matter how compelling the case or mitigating the circumstances—
unless the person provides “substantial assistance” or qualifies for the “safety 
valve.”9 Like the BRA, Congress passed these laws in the 1980s, when fear about 
 
5    18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C) provides that prosecutors can move for temporary detention in any 
case that involves “an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is 
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import 
and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of Title 46 [46 USCS § 70501 et seq.].” 18 
U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C) (2008). This encompasses nearly all federal drug offenses.  
6    See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A) (2008).  
7    See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 10–
11 (Sept. 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/17-sep_final_0.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT]. 
8    See Letter from the Judicial Conference of the United States to the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees, Enclosure 2 at 2 (Apr. 28, 2020), [hereinafter 2020 Judicial Conference 
Letter]. 
9    Approximately 66% of all drug trafficking cases in Fiscal Year 2019 carried a mandatory 
minimum penalty. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN DRUG 
TRAFFICKING CASES—FISCAL YEAR 2019 122, Figure D-2 (2019), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-
sourcebooks/2019/FigureD2.pdf. Of those cases, 42.2% received no relief from the mandatory 
minimum penalty at all, while 17% received relief for providing “substantial assistance” and 31% 
received relief for satisfying the requirements for the “safety valve.” Id. Prosecutors “have virtually 
total discretion to make one or both motions.” Mark W. Bennett, A Slow Motion Lynching? The War 
on Drugs, Mass Incarceration, Doing Kimbrough Justice, and a Response to Two Third Circuit Judges, 
66 RUTGERS L. REV. 873, 885 (2014).  
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crime and drugs was at its apex. While mandatory minimums have been roundly 
criticized across the political spectrum and there is clear evidence they do not work,10 
they remain on the books because Congress has not mustered the political will to 
meaningfully reform or eliminate them.  
Beyond the mandatory minimums, people charged with federal drug offenses 
often face even higher sentences under the drug sentencing guidelines, which 
primarily focus on drug type and quantity in setting the punishment.11 Finally, if 
someone charged with a drug offense has been convicted of more than one felony 
drug offense in the past, they face a still-higher sentence under the career offender 
sentencing guideline, even though the Sentencing Commission recently urged 
Congress to amend the law to exclude “drug trafficking only” career offenders.12 
The statistics highlight how the laws that apply to drug cases at bail and 
sentencing have contributed to mass incarceration and racial injustice. Today, drug 
offenses make up nearly 30% of the federal docket nationwide.13 From 1990 to 2008, 
that percentage was even higher—varying from approximately 35% to as high as 
47%.14 In contrast, when the BRA and the 1986 Act were enacted, drug offenses 
 
10   See, e.g., The Pew Charitable Trusts, Federal Drug Sentencing Laws Bring High Cost, Low 
Return, 3–4 (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-
briefs/2015/08/federal-drug-sentencing-laws-bring-high-cost-low-return (despite decades of 
mandatory minimum drug laws, drug prices have declined while drug use and purity have increased); 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 66 (2002), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drug-
topics/200205-rtc-cocaine-sentencing-policy/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf  
(“The declining prices for powder cocaine during the period of increasing penalties appear inconsistent 
with a deterrent effect of federal cocaine penalties.”); Eduardo Porter, Numbers Tell of Failure in Drug 
War, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/business/in-rethinking-the-
war-on-drugs-start-with-the-numbers.html; Tanya Golash-Boza, America’s Mass Incarceration 
Problem in 5 Charts—or, Why Sessions Shouldn’t Bring Back Mandatory Minimums, THE 
CONVERSATION (May 29, 2017), https://theconversation.com/americas-mass-incarceration-problem-
in-5-charts-or-why-sessions-shouldnt-bring-back-mandatory-minimums-78019.  
11   See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) 
(drug quantity table). 
12   See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER SENTENCING 
ENHANCEMENTS (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-
and-reports/criminal-history/201607_RtC-Career-Offenders.pdf [hereinafter 2016 CAREER OFFENDER 
REPORT]. 
13   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS 45 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf 
[hereinafter 2019 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
14   See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK ARCHIVES, https://www.ussc.gov 
/research/sourcebook/archive. The online Archives start in 1996. Pre-1996 statistics are found in the 
Commission’s Annual Reports. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORTS ARCHIVES, 
https://www.ussc.gov/about/annual-report/archive.  
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constituted just 18% of the federal docket,15 and fraud and regulatory crimes 
dominated.16 At the bail stage, judges detain people charged with drug offenses at 
an astonishingly high rate. A 2017 government study found that the presumption of 
detention applied in 93% of all federal drug cases, even though it was intended to 
apply to rich drug traffickers who could buy their way out of jail.17 From 1995 to 
2010, the percentage of people charged with federal drug offenses who were jailed 
while awaiting trial increased from 76% to 84%.18 At the back end, at sentencing, it 
is a virtual certainty that anyone convicted of a federal drug offense will spend time 
behind bars: 96.3% of drug offenders were sentenced to prison in Fiscal Year 2019 
and approximately 66% were convicted of an offense that carried a mandatory 
minimum penalty.19 The average sentence was 76 months, but varied by drug type.20 
These trends have remained stable over time.21 
Moreover, in the years since the BRA and the 1986 Act were passed, people of 
color have borne the brunt of these harsh federal drug laws. At the bail stage, people 
of color are detained before trial at a higher rate than whites, even after controlling 
for other factors that are predictive of detention or release.22 At the sentencing stage, 
troubling racial disparities exist as well. The most recent Sentencing Commission 
data shows that in Fiscal Year 2019, fully 75% of those sentenced for federal drug 
offenses were people of color: 44.3% were Hispanic and 27.4% were Black.23 By 
 
15   Administration of Bail by State and Federal Courts: A Call for Reform: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th  
Cong. 16 (2019), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU08/20191114/110194/HHRG-116-JU08-
Wstate-SieglerA-20191114.pdf [hereinafter Siegler Written Statement] (citing John Scalia, Federal 
Drug Offenders, 1999 with Trends 1984–99, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics Special 
Report at 1 (Aug. 2001), https://www.Csdp.org/research/fdo99.pdf) (Written Statement of Alison 
Siegler). 
16   Thomas H. Cohen & Amaryllis Austin, Examining Federal Pretrial Release Trends Over the 
Last Decade, 82 FED. PROBATION 3, 4 (2018). 
17   See Amaryllis Austin, The Presumption for Detention Statute’s Relationship to Release 
Rates, 81 FED. PROBATION 52, 55 (2017). 
18   Id. at 53. 
19   2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 62, Table 13, 122, Figure D-2. The 96.3% figure 
excludes the 563 people convicted of drug possession—a rare charge in the federal system. Id. at 62. 
20   Id. at 64, Table 15.  
21   See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK ARCHIVES, https://www.ussc.gov/research/ 
sourcebook/archive.  
22   Stephanie Holmes Didwania, Discretion and Disparity in Federal Detention, 115 NW. U.L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2021) (detailing the results of an empirical study of 300,000 federal cases from 
2002 to 2016).  
23   2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 110, Table D-2.  
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comparison, the general population is 18.5% Hispanic and 13.4% Black.24 Data also 
shows that people of color ultimately face longer prison terms than whites arrested 
for the same offenses with the same prior records.25 For example, the Sentencing 
Commission recently found that when Black men and White men commit the very 
same crime, Black men on average receive a sentence that is nearly 20% longer.26 
Some of this is certainly a result of mandatory minimum charging, which 
“introduces sizeable racial disparities” into the system.27 Data also shows that Black 
people who are convicted of a federal drug offense carrying a mandatory minimum 
are least likely to receive a sentence below the minimum.28  
In this paper, we argue that federal judges have a critical role to play in future 
federal drug law reform in light of Congress’ long-standing failures to meaningfully 
change the laws. Judges can use their considerable discretion at both stages to 
counteract the unwarranted harshness of these laws and ameliorate the racial 
disparities. At both ends, judges should emphasize the evidence that the pretrial drug 
presumption, the drug sentencing guideline, and the career offender sentencing 
guideline are flawed.29 While judicial action is not a cure for Congress’ inaction, it 
 
24   U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS 2019, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ 
US/PST045219.  
25   See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 
J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1349 (2014); Written Submission of the American Civil Liberties Union on Racial 
Disparities in Sentencing: Hearing on Reports of Racism in the Justice System of the United States, 
153rd Session Inter-Am. Comm’n on Hum. Rts 1, 1–2 (2014) [hereinafter ACLU Written Submission]; 
Bennett, supra note 9, at 881–82 (chronicling the demographics of crack cocaine defendants in federal 
court and noting that “[n]early 83% of the . . . crack defendants sentenced in 2012 were black”). 
26   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING: AN UPDATE TO THE 
2012 BOOKER REPORT 2 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publication 
s/research-publications/2017/20171114_Demographics.pdf.  
27   Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing 
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 10 (2013) (“Our research suggests 
that prosecutorial decisions are important sources of [racial] disparity—especially the decision to file 
mandatory minimum charges, which are prosecutors’ most powerful tools for constraining judges.”).  
28   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 8 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/ 
research-publications/2017/20171025_Drug-Mand-Min.pdf [hereinafter 2017 MANDATORY MINIMUM 
REPORT].  
29   In 2015, Federal District Judge Jed Rakoff called for judges to speak out about mass 
incarceration, mandatory minimums, and the sentencing guidelines. “What is called for in such 
circumstances is leadership: those whom the public does respect should point out why statutes 
prescribing mandatory minimums, draconian guidelines, and the like are not the solution to controlling 
crime, and why, in any case, the long-term price of mass incarceration is too high to pay, not just in 
economic terms, but also in terms of shared social values.” Jed S. Rakoff, Mass Incarceration: The 
Silence of the Judges, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (May 15, 2015), https://www.nybooks.com/ 
articles/2015/05/21/mass-incarceration-silence-judges/.  
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would send a clear message from one co-equal branch of government to another that 
substantive reform is urgently needed.30  
At the front end, judges should encourage the pretrial release of more people 
by closely scrutinizing prosecutors’ motions for temporary detention at the initial 
appearance stage and giving little weight to the drug presumption of detention at the 
detention hearing stage.  
At the back end, judges should issue categorical policy disagreements with the 
drug sentencing guidelines and the career offender sentencing guideline using the 
Supreme Court’s blueprint in Kimbrough v. United States.31 These guidelines are 
not based on empirical evidence and national experience, and therefore do not 
exemplify the Sentencing Commission’s “exercise of its characteristic institutional 
role.”32 Accordingly, they warrant less respect and adherence than other guidelines. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the front-end problem—the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984s provisions that favor pretrial detention for people charged 
with federal drug offenses. Part II discusses the back-end problem—the history of 
drug mandatory minimums and the drug sentencing guidelines, including the career 
offender guideline. Part III discusses attempts to reform the federal pretrial detention 
system and federal drug laws and situates them within current efforts to reform the 
criminal legal system. Part IV concludes by discussing how judges can advance 
reform at bail and sentencing. 
 
II. THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984’S MISGUIDED FOCUS ON FEDERAL DRUG 
OFFENSES 
 
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution mandates that “[e]xcessive bail 
shall not be required.”33 Congress enacted the first federal bail provision as part of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, and for nearly 200 years, the federal bail system “was 
premised on a defendant’s right to bail for all non-capital offenses if the defendant 
could post sufficient sureties.”34 But because release was based on a person’s 
financial resources, people who were indigent had few options for release.35 Those 
 
30   Id. (“[W]hile this treatment is mandated by the legislature, it is we judges who mete it out. 
Unless we judges make more effort to speak out against this inhumanity, how can we call ourselves 
instruments of justice?”).  
31   552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
32   Id. at 109. 
33   U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
34   Austin, supra note 17, at 52; see also Alexa Van Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, Toward a Just 
Model of Pretrial Release: A History of Bail Reform and a Prescription for What’s Next, 108 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 701, 710 (2018) (“In the colonial era, bail was generally synonymous with 
release.”).  
35   Austin, supra note 17, at 52; see also Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 34, at 724 (“Bail 
reform gained momentum throughout the decade. The National Conference on Bail and Criminal 
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concerns led to the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, which created a 
presumption of release without financial conditions and focused a judge’s bail 
determination on non-appearance for court hearings.36 Dangerousness was not a 
consideration.37  
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 was “a progressive step forward” because it 
“disfavored wealth-based distinctions” and highlighted “the importance of 
individualized decision-making” at the bail stage.38 As a result, pretrial release rates 
increased throughout the 1970s.39 This progress was temporary, however, as the 
country “entered an era defined by tough-on-crime rhetoric and related legislative 
action.”40 In the 1980s, legislators became myopically focused on violent crime and 
keeping violent offenders off the streets.41 For example, Senator Lawton Chiles 
referred to a “crime wave” that diminished the public’s confidence “in the ability of 
our courts to deal with criminals,” during hearings on the BRA.42 He traced the 
public’s supposed lack of confidence to the bail system: “[T]he way it operates today 
does as much as any other criminal justice procedure to foster that lack of confidence 
in our courts.”43 He urged Congress to pass bail reform that permitted judges to 
consider dangerousness.44 The Department of Justice took the same position.45 
That view won out, and the federal bail framework changed dramatically with 
Congress’ passage of the BRA in 1984, at the height of the War on Drugs. Instead 
of focusing solely on whether a person posed a risk of flight, the BRA permitted 
 
Justice, held in the spring of 1964, focused on alternatives to money bail with the purpose of eliminating 
the intentional detention of the poor.”). 
36   Austin, supra note 17, at 52; Federal Bail Procedures Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee 
on the Judiciary United States Senate, 89th Cong. 5, 33 (1965) (text of s. 1357). 
37   See Austin, supra note 17, at 52. 
38   Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 34, at 725–26. 
39   See id. at 725. 
40   See id. at 730. 
41   See id. at 731. 
42   Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
97th Cong. 59 (1981), at 56 [hereinafter 1981 Hearings] (Statement of Hon. Lawton Chiles, a U.S. 
Senator from the State of Florida).  
43   Id. 
44   Id. at 57. 
45   Id. at 156 (Statement of Jeffrey Harris, Deputy Associate Attorney General of the United 
States) (testifying that in order “to provide an adequate mechanism to deal with the dangerous 
defendants who are seeking release,” courts “must be given the authority to order the detention of those 
defendants who are so dangerous that no condition of release will reasonably assure the safety of the 
community or other persons”).   
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judges to consider future dangerousness when making a release decision.46 The 
Supreme Court concluded that the BRA was constitutional even with the new focus 
on dangerousness, emphasizing that release was the “norm” and detention “the 
carefully limited exception.”47 
The BRA made two important changes that target people charged with drug 
offenses for pretrial detention. At the initial appearance stage, the BRA authorizes 
mandatory temporary detention at the government’s request.48 At the detention 
hearing stage, the BRA mandates a rebuttable presumption that the person be 
detained throughout the case.49 Both provisions apply to any drug offense that carries 
a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more. Virtually all federal drug 
offenses subject individuals to these heightened detention standards. They apply to 
all offenses involving a hard drug and any marijuana offense involving 50 or more 
kilograms, and they apply without regard to a person’s role, culpability in the 
offense, or lack of prior convictions.50 Thus, these detention provisions sweep up 
alleged drug kingpins and low-level mules alike, and fall as heavily on first offenders 
as on those with long rap sheets.51 
The drug presumption has had a significant impact on pretrial detention in 
federal drug cases. The fact that the presumption applied in 93% of all federal drug 
cases52 is a direct consequence of the 1980s anti-drug sentiment: “[T]he 
presumptions were . . . created in the midst of the ‘War on Drugs’; therefore, the 
cases targeted by these presumptions were largely drug offenses.”53 The 
presumption has also resulted in extremely high detention rates. While just 16% of 
people charged with federal drug offenses were released pretrial in 2013,54 people 
charged with state-level felony drug offenses in large urban areas were released 65% 
 
46   Austin, supra note 17, at 53; see also Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention 
and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 346 (1990) (“The Bail Reform Act of 1984 makes protection 
of the public the pivotal factor in determining whether to release or detain federal defendants.”).  
47   United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
48   See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C) (2008). 
49   See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A) (2008). 
50   See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 960(b) (2018). 
51   See Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 17; Reevaluating the Effectiveness of 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 225–26 
(2013) (Written Statement of the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic at the University of Chicago Law 
School). 
52   Austin, supra note 17, at 55.  
53   Cohen & Austin, supra note 16, at 4.  
54   Austin, supra note 17, at 53. 
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of the time in 2009.55 These state release rates are likely to be even higher today 
given the bail reform movement sweeping the country.56 
While much has been written about the BRA generally, the legislative history 
of the drug presumption of detention has not been explored in depth. That debate is 
illustrative of just how far the presumption has strayed from its original purpose. A 
close look at the BRA’s legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not intend 
the drug presumption to apply so broadly. Rather, legislators wanted the drug 
presumption to prevent rich people suspected of high-level drug trafficking from 
fleeing to avoid prosecution.57 When the BRA was debated, drug prosecutions were 
not nearly as prevalent as they are today and therefore the drug presumption would 
not have affected “a majority of cases.”58 Of course, as drug prosecutions increased 
exponentially over the next decades, the presumption became more central to 
detention decisions.59  
As legislators debated changes to the BRA that would favor pretrial detention 
in drug cases, they used hyperbolic language to describe the country’s drug problem. 
That language reflected the 1980s War on Drugs mentality.60 Senator Lawton Chiles, 
who hailed from Florida, stated that the BRA required “specially crafted” provisions 
to “ensure that those who are responsible for the drug problem which has swept this 
country are brought to justice.”61 Senator Orrin Hatch, without citing any evidence, 
contended that bail reform in drug cases was needed because drug offenders 
“historically abused bail proceedings more than most criminal offenders.”62 
Senator Chiles was one of the most forceful proponents for adding a 
presumption of detention in drug cases.63 He believed that drug trafficking cases 
posed a “special problem” because of “a revolving door situation” where people 
 
55   Brian A. Reaves, Federal Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 200—Statistical Tables, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, at 15 (Dec. 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf. 
56   Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People From 
Jail, Explained, VOX (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-
reform-criminal-justice-inequality.  
57   This idea stems from discussions with Jennesa Calvo-Friedman of the American Civil 
Liberties Union.  
58   Cohen & Austin, supra note 16, at 4.  
59   Id. 
60   See, e.g., Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and 
Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 398 (1995) (discussing how by the 1980s “the hyperbole of the ‘drug 
war’—really a kind of ‘drug market civil war’—was used evermore irresponsibly.”).  
61   1981 Hearings, supra note 42, at 59.  
62   Id. at 56.  
63   Id. at 56–57. 
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were released on bond and then failed to appear in court.64 He used his own state of 
Florida as an example. He claimed that the “massive invasion of illicit drugs” there 
enabled drug dealers to reap proceeds from $7 billion to $10 billion a year.65 Such 
large amounts of cash meant that “no matter how high bail is set, the drug smuggler 
who has been arrested will make bail” and “will never appear in court.”66 For these 
“drug smuggler[s],” bail forfeiture was “no more than a temporary business loss.”67 
Accordingly, Chiles believed that allowing judges to consider dangerousness at the 
bond stage was not enough to “solve the special problem of drug dealers” and 
insisted that legislators also add a presumption of detention.68  
Chiles explained that a presumption of detention would establish “special 
considerations” for bail in drug cases that would “go a long way toward closing that 
revolving door and would help assure that drug dealers who are arrested are brought 
to justice.”69 The presumption would operate so that the person “should not be given 
bail unless he could show mitigating factors.”70 Chiles believed that the presumption 
of detention would provide judges with “more direction” in making bond 
determinations in drug cases, ultimately “denying bail to drug dealers in many 
instances.”71 
Other legislators and the Department of Justice echoed Chiles’ concerns. The 
Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator Strom Thurmond, argued that there 
should be a presumption of detention for the “most serious” drug offenses because 
it is “well known that drug trafficking is carried on to an unusual degree by persons 
engaged in continuing patterns of criminal activity” and they “have both the 
resources and foreign contacts to escape to other countries with relative ease.”72 In 
his 1984 testimony, Deputy Attorney General James Knapp emphasized that 
detention was appropriate for “major drug traffickers” because drug fugitives 
outnumbered federal drug agents.73 He noted that some “drug figures” were “even 
 
64   Id. at 57; see also JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN 127 (2017) (one of the reasons 
the Black community in Washington, D.C. supported tougher drug laws in the 1980s was the perception 
of “excessive leniency” at the bail stage).  
65   1981 Hearings, supra note 42, at 57.  
66   Id.  
67   Id.  
68   1981 Hearings, supra note 42, at 59. 
69   Id. at 58.  
70   Id.  
71   Id. at 59, 62. 
72   The Bail Reform Act of 1983: Report of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate 
on S. 215, 98th Cong., S. REP. NO. 98-147 (1983), at 46.  
73   Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of 
Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 191 (1984), at 191 [hereinafter 1984 Hearings] 
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adopting the practice of setting aside a portion of their illegal proceeds” to pay bail 
forfeitures.74  
The BRA’s legislative history shows that legislators were shortsighted about 
the implications of the drug presumption. For his part, Knapp foreshadowed that the 
drug presumption would apply even to those “without any prior record or evidence 
of criminal history.”75 But that was not on legislators’ radar. By focusing on “major 
drug traffickers” at a time when drug cases made up a small percentage of the federal 
docket, legislators do not appear to have contemplated—or cared—that the drug 
presumption would sweep too broadly. 
Today, the problems with the drug presumption are clear and well 
documented.76 The presumption applies equally to first offenders and people 
charged with low-level, nonviolent drug offenses, it leads to high detention rates, 
and falls most heavily on people of color. Judges have a responsibility to use their 
discretion to mitigate these injustices.  
 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES  
 
As with the federal bail regime, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches 
each has a hand in the federal sentencing regime. Congress passes laws that set 
minimum and maximum penalties for drug offenses, prosecutors determine what 
charges to file, and the Sentencing Commission—an independent agency housed in 
the judicial branch—determines the sentencing guidelines that are the “starting 
point” for judges at sentencing.77 But Congress’ laws, most notably mandatory 
minimum sentencing statutes, ultimately trump the Commission’s guidelines. What 
 
(Testimony of James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, on Behalf of the U.S. 
Department of Justice). 
74   Id. at 191. 
75   Id. at 256. 
76   In a June 1, 1984 letter to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, the Department of Justice downplayed the “costs” of 
adopting a bail regime that considered danger to the community, writing that “the number of persons 
who are so dangerous as to warrant pretrial detention in the federal system is small.” 1984 Hearings, 
supra note 73, at 313 (Letter of Deputy Assistant Attorney General James Knapp). 
77   See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
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follows is an overview of how mandatory minimums and the guidelines evolved and 
how they operate in tandem and tension today. 
 
A. The Controlled Substances Act & Federal Drug Mandatory Minimums 
 
Drug mandatory minimums date back to the early twentieth century, and have 
often been linked to fears about race and crime.78 The first mandatory minimum was 
passed in 1914, when Congress set a five-year minimum for manufacturing opium 
for smoking purposes.79 The law was influenced by widespread anti-Chinese 
sentiment. For example, in 1902, the American Pharmaceutical Association’s 
Committee on the Acquirement of the Drug Habit blamed Chinese immigrants for 
“importing” opium smoking to the United States. The Committee concluded, “If the 
Chinaman cannot get along without his ‘dope,’ we can get along without him.”80  
More mandatory minimums followed until the 1970s when politicians began to 
recognize that mandatory minimums were not working. Then-Congressman George 
H.W. Bush spoke in favor of repealing mandatory minimum drug laws because it 
would “result in better justice and more appropriate sentences.”81 The Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”), passed in 1970, was a radical departure from prior drug 
laws. It eliminated all mandatory minimums, except those relating to drug 
kingpins.82 It also imposed a “unified legal framework” to regulate drugs.83 Under 
the CSA, drugs were grouped “based on their accepted medical uses, the potential 
for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body.”84 Drugs in 
Schedule 1, such as marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine, were categorized as 
such because “of their high potential for abuse, lack of any accepted medical use, 
and the absence of any accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment.”85 
 
78   MONA LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS: THE COERCIVE POWER OF DRUG LAWS IN FEDERAL COURT 
15 (2016). 
79   See Harrison Narcotics Tax, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 278 (1914). 
80   JEFF GOLDBERG & DEAN LATIMER, FLOWERS IN THE BLOOD: THE STORY OF OPIUM 210 
(2014). 
81   Molly M. Gill, Correcting Course: Lessons from the 1970s Repeal of Mandatory Minimums, 
21 FED. SENT’G REP. 55, 55 (2008).  
82   See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SER., R45074, MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING 
FOR FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES 2 (2018).  
83   JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RESEARCH SER., R45948, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
(CSA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 2 (2019). 
84   Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 13 (2005). 
85   Id. at 14. 
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The purported objectives of the CSA were “to conquer drug abuse and to control the 
legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”86  
The pendulum swung back in favor of mandatory minimum sentencing with 
the rise of the crack cocaine “epidemic.” Crack cocaine was widely seen as 
devastating Black communities in urban cities.87 The media devoted story after story 
to “crack babies” and “gangbangers.”88 The overdose death of basketball star Len 
Bias—ironically from powder cocaine, not crack cocaine as first reported by the 
media89—was all that it took for Congress to act, and overreact.90  
With haste, Congress passed the 1986 Act, which established the framework 
for the current federal mandatory minimum drug laws. The Act set five- and ten-
year mandatory minimum sentences for most drug offenses based on the type and 
quantity of the drug.91 Those mandatory minimums could be increased to 10 or 20 
years if the person had been convicted of a felony drug offense in the past.92 Two 
years later, legislators passed a three-strikes law for drugs: if a person was subject 
to a 10-year mandatory minimum and had two prior drug convictions, the 
government could seek a jaw-dropping mandatory minimum sentence of life.93 The 
1986 Act also established the 100-to-1 crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity 
that was on the books until the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced it to 18-to-1.94  
 
86   Id. at 12. 
87  Forman, supra note 64, at 156 (“In the magnitude of the threat it posed to black America, the 
crack epidemic exceeded even the heroin crisis of the late 1960s.”). 
88   See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 52–53 (2010). 
89   John Schuppe, 30 Years After Basketball Star Len Bias’ Death, Its Drug War Impact 
Endures, NBC NEWS (June 19, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/30-years-after-
basketball-star-len-bias-death-its-drug-n593731.  
90   See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1995 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY (1995), http://www.ussc.gov/report-cocaine-and-federal-sentencing-policy-2.  
91   Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 95 (2007).  
92   See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 851 (2007); Lynch, supra note 78, at 26. 
93   Lynch, supra note 78, at 26. The Third Strike Project highlights the heartbreaking injustices 
of the federal three strikes drug law, which Congress eliminated in the FSA. “The law requires the 
judge to impose a life sentence in drug cases—even when the judge believes a life sentence is excessive. 
For many judges, the 3 Strikes Law is a crisis of conscience. A number of federal judges—powerless 
from the bench—have spoken out and bravely questioned whether Congress really intended to 
rubberstamp life sentences onto people.” See The Third Strike, https://www.thirdstrike 
campaign.com/powerless. Because Congress did not make this change retroactive, there are still people 
serving mandatory minimum life sentences under the law. See id. at https://www.thirdstrike 
campaign.com/policy.  
94   This new ratio, like the old one, is suspect. See ACLU Submission on Racial Disparities in 
Sentencing, at 6 (“While the FSA was a step toward increased fairness, the 18-to-1 ratio continues to 
perpetuate the outdated and discredited assumptions about crack cocaine that gave rise to the 
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The original sin of drug sentencing is the 1986 Act’s reliance on drug type and 
quantity to identify “‘major’ and ‘serious’ dealers.”95 That framework has failed 
because drug type and quantity are often very bad proxies for culpability.96 In a 2011 
report, the Commission wrote that “the quantity of drugs involved in an offense is 
not as closely related to the offender’s function in the offense as perhaps Congress 
expected.”97 More recently, the Commission observed that while Congress intended 
the 1986 Act’s mandatory minimums to apply to high-level traffickers, they apply 
disproportionately to low-level offenders instead.98  
The federal judiciary has likewise spoken out against mandatory minimum drug 
laws and their overemphasis on drug type and quantity. For example, in its 2013 
letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Judicial Conference outlined the 
problems with the law’s misguided focus on drug type and quantity.99 Nonetheless, 
the First Step Act made no changes to that core organizing principle of the 1986 Act.  
 
B. The Sentencing Commission & the Formulation of the Sentencing Guidelines 
 
With the exception of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, for most of the 
19th and 20th centuries, federal judges had near unlimited sentencing discretion.100 
Around the same time that politicians like then-Congressman Bush were questioning 
the wisdom of mandatory minimum sentences, prominent judges and academics 
began to rail against the extent of judicial discretion and the perceived sentencing 
disparities that resulted. Judge Marvin Frankel, called the “father of sentencing 
 
unwarranted 100-to-1 disparity in the first place.”); see also Alexander, supra note 88, at 139 (“There 
should be no disparity—the ratio should be one-to-one.”). 
95   Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 95.  
96   For example, the Commission’s data shows that only 7.3% of people who were sentenced 
for drug offenses in Fiscal Year 2019 were considered to be “high-level” traffickers: leaders, managers, 
or supervisors in drug enterprises. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 117, Table D-9. The FSA 
acknowledges that role in the offense distinguishes drug offenders from one another. It codifies that 
those who the sentencing judge determines to be an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others 
in the offense” are ineligible for “earned time credits” for participating in rehabilitative programming. 
See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 756, 132 Stat. 5194, 5202 (2018).  
97    U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 350 (2011). 
98   See 2017 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 28, at 6 (noting that “nearly one-third 
(32.2%) of Couriers and more than one-quarter of Mules (25.4%) were convicted of such offenses”).  
99   See, e.g., Letter from Honorable Robert Holmes Bell to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, at 5 (Sept. 
17, 2013), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judge-bell-chairman-leahy-mandatory-minimu 
ms.pdf. 
100  See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). 
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reform,” led the charge to cabin judges’ sentencing discretion.101 He believed that 
limiting discretion would promote sentencing uniformity and drastically reduce 
disparities.102 While pre-guidelines sentencing disparities certainly existed, Judge 
Frankel “did not foresee (or at least did not discuss) the possibility that written 
sentencing rules could have the effect of transferring sentencing discretion [from 
judges] to prosecutors.”103 
Judge Frankel’s concerns about judicial discretion were heeded by those on 
Capitol Hill and culminated in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”). The 
SRA drastically changed federal judges’ role in the sentencing process and curtailed 
their discretion. The centerpiece of the SRA was the creation of the Commission, 
which in turn authored the federal sentencing guidelines.  
The Commission has several statutory purposes: (1) to establish “sentencing 
policies and practices” that satisfy the § 3553(a) purposes of sentencing, including 
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, while at the same time providing 
“sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by 
mitigating or aggravating factors” not accounted for by the guidelines; (2) to reflect  
“advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice 
process”; and (3) to “develop means of measuring the degree to which the 
sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes 
of sentencing” in § 3553(a)(2).104  
The SRA established safeguards to ensure that the Commission employed an 
empirical approach. It required the Commission to review and revise the guidelines 
based on consultation with all the players in the system, including judges and experts 
in the field.105 It also mandated collecting and systematizing data about the 
sentencing process, the sentences judges impose, and the relationship between those 
sentences and the § 3553(a) factors.106  
As the Supreme Court observed in Rita, the Commission’s reliance on 
empirical evidence and its review and revision of the guidelines over time in light 
of judicial decisions, sentencing data, and consultation with participants and experts 
are at the core of its characteristic institutional role.107 The Supreme Court saw this 
iterative process as essential: “The Commission’s work is ongoing. The statutes and 
the Sentencing Guidelines themselves foresee a continuous evolution helped by the 
 
101  Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 
117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1427 (2008). 
102  Id. 
103  Id.  
104  28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2008).  
105  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (1994).  
106  28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12)–(16) (2010).  
107  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2007).  
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sentencing courts and courts of appeals in that process.”108 One crucial aspect of this 
process is that sentencing judges must articulate reasons for their sentences.109 
Congress expected the Commission to take stock of data and past sentencing 
practices in formulating the guidelines, and anticipated that guideline sentences 
would be—on average—similar to pre-guidelines sentences in most cases.110 The 
Commission began with an “empirical examination of 10,000 presentence reports 
setting forth what judges had done in the past and then modifying and adjusting past 
practice[.]”111 From there, the Commission incorporated “a vast array of heavily 
weighted aggravating factors”112 and set its standard for when judges could sentence 
below the guidelines, permitting downward departures only in “atypical” cases.113 
The Commission did not explain why it chose to undervalue mitigating factors in 
the guidelines.114 Moreover, it “did not estimate the impact of mitigating offender 
characteristics on past sentences,” even though “judges had routinely considered 
those factors.”115 As a result, there are real questions about whether the 
Commission’s formulation of the guidelines was based on empirical evidence and 
past practices, as Congress directed.116 
The guidelines are a complex and rigid set of sentencing factors based on the 
seriousness of the offense and the person’s criminal history. Each federal crime is 
assigned a base offense level, which is the starting point for determining the 
seriousness of the particular offense.117 In addition to the base offense levels, each 
offense has specific offense characteristics that increase or decrease the base offense 
level. There are also adjustments and departures, which similarly increase or 
decrease the base offense level. The result of these calculations is the total offense 
level. That is coupled with the person’s criminal history category—ranging from 
one to six based on prior criminal history—to produce a guidelines range in months. 
There are also recidivist sentencing provisions, like the career offender guideline, 
 
108  Id. at 350. 
109  Id. 
110  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 116 (1983). 
111  Rita, 551 U.S. at 349. 
112  Amy Baron-Evans & Thomas W. Hillier II, The Commission’s Legislative Agenda to Restore 
Mandatory Guidelines, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 293, 294 (2013). 
113  Id. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  See, e.g., id.  
117  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_Sentencing_Guideline
s.pdf. 
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which override offense-specific guidelines and set the offense level based on the 
offense’s maximum penalty.118 The guidelines undervalue mitigating factors and 
give them little role at sentencing.119  
Congress requires judges to communicate regularly with the Commission about 
the sentences they impose. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(w), the Chief Judge of every 
federal district must submit to the Commission, within thirty days following the 
entry of judgment, a report of the sentence.120 The report must include “the written 
statement of reasons for the sentence imposed (which shall include the reason for 
any departure from the otherwise applicable guideline range . . . . ).”121 Judges may 
also, of course, issue written opinions that explain their decisions. 
 
C. The Booker “Revolution” and Kimbrough 
 
Before United States v. Booker rendered the guidelines advisory, it was 
virtually mandatory for judges to sentence people within the applicable guideline 
range. If the sentencing judge misapplied the guidelines or departed from the range 
for any reason beyond those allowed for by the guidelines, appellate judges were on 
hand to “police” them.122 With looming appellate review, the Commission’s 
“proclamations were not merely ‘guidelines’ or recommendations, but enforceable 
rules that sentencing judges were legally obliged to follow.”123 In essence, the 
Commission “micromanage[d] the sentencing function of federal [sentencing] 
judges,” And the courts of appeals did the same.124 
Judges frequently expressed their displeasure at the rigidity of the guidelines, 
in ways similar to their frustration with mandatory minimums. An article in the 
Baltimore Sun in 1992—just five years after the guidelines went into effect—put it 
 
118  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).  
119  See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. 
L. REV. 1109, 1119 (2008) (“Prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s 
prior good works were often raised and considered at sentencing. When it initially formed and directed 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission to develop the Guidelines, Congress made no specific mention of an 
offender’s prior good works as a sentencing factor.”). 
120  28 U.S.C. § 992(w)(1) & (w)(1)(B) (2018). 
121  Id. 
122  See Kate Stith, The Hegemony of the Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 14, 16 
(1996) (noting the responsibility of courts of appeals to “police” departures); Alison Siegler, Rebellion: 
The Courts of Appeals’ Latest Anti-Booker Backlash, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 202 (2015) (“From 1987 
to 2005,  . . . the Guidelines were mandatory and appellate courts policed sentencing courts closely, 
engaging in rigorous, guidelines-centric appellate review.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
123  Stith, supra note 101, at 1429. 
124  Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants 
Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2122 (2003).  
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this way: “Judges say the guidelines fail to achieve fairness, often are too confusing 
and undermine the fairness of criminal trials by taking power from the judge, the 
impartial player, and handing it to the prosecutors, who are advocates for the 
government.”125 These critiques have continued over the years. In 2016, District 
Court Judge John Coughenour, who became a judge before the advent of the 
guidelines regime, opined that “the standardization of sentences has resulted in less 
justice, not more, and that the way the nation sentences criminals today has created 
greater inequality, not less.”126 
While federal public defenders and other criminal defense attorneys challenged 
the guidelines as unconstitutional from their inception, the guidelines were widely 
seen as unassailable, even into the early 2000s. Then the Supreme Court decided 
United States v. Booker. The facts of the case were simple: Booker was arrested and 
police officers found 92.5 grams of crack cocaine in his duffel bag.127 He later 
admitted to selling an additional 566 grams of crack cocaine.128 He went to trial and 
the jury found that he was guilty of possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 
grams of crack.129 At sentencing, however, the district court judge found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he had distributed more crack than the jury had 
found.130 Accordingly, the judge increased Booker’s base offense under the 
guidelines and sentenced him to thirty years.131  
Booker appealed, arguing that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment. The 
Supreme Court ultimately issued two holdings: (1) the constitutional holding—that 
the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they allowed judges to find 
facts that increased the defendant’s punishment above the statutory maximum by a 
preponderance of the evidence rather than the jury making those findings beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and (2) the remedial holding—that the constitutional infirmity 
could be remedied by making the guidelines advisory, as opposed to mandatory.132 
In Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme Court extended judicial discretion 
still further, holding that district court judges could vary from the guidelines based 
 
125  Norris P. West, Federal Judges Complain of Rigid Sentencing Guidelines, BALTIMORE SUN 
(Sept. 28, 1992), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1992-09-28-1992272170-story.html. 
126  Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-makes-the-case-for-judgment/ 
463380/. 
127  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005). 
128  Id. at 235. 
129  Id. at 227. 
130  Id.  
131  Id.  
132  Id. at 244–45. 
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on a policy disagreement.133 Kimbrough is in many ways a surprising case, both 
because of its procedural history and its holding. There was no circuit split—instead, 
the appellate courts had uniformly held that judges could not disagree with the 
crack/powder cocaine guidelines on policy grounds. The Supreme Court accepted 
the case nonetheless and ultimately granted sentencing judges more power.134  
The district court judge in Kimbrough had concluded that the 100-to-1 
crack/powder disparity led to a sentencing range that was much greater than 
necessary to accomplish § 3553(a)’s objectives.135 He contrasted Kimbrough’s 
guidelines range of 228 to 270 months (19 to 22 years) with the drastically lower 97 
to 106 month range (8 to 9 years) that Kimbrough would have faced if the drug were 
powder cocaine, rather than crack cocaine.136 He found this difference 
“unbelievable” and “clearly inappropriate.”137 Accordingly, the judge varied below 
the applicable guideline range, although he could not reduce Kimbrough’s sentence 
below the 15-year mandatory minimum, which he also believed was “too long.”138 
The government appealed the sentence and, in a per curiam opinion, the Fourth 
Circuit vacated the sentence as unreasonable.139  
The Supreme Court began its opinion by laying out the history of the 
crack/powder disparity, starting with the 1986 Act’s focus on drug quantity to set 
mandatory minimum sentences.140 As the Court explained, the 100-to-1 ratio was 
created because “Congress apparently believed that crack was significantly more 
dangerous than powder cocaine.”141 But in reaching this conclusion, Congress relied 
on “assumptions,” not evidence.142 In lockstep response, the Commission developed 
guidelines that simply adopted Congress’ weight-driven scheme without basing the 
drug guidelines “on data about past sentencing practices” as it was supposed to do.143 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission “did not use [its] 
empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking 
 
133  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). A “variance” is a sentencing reduction or 
increase that is imposed pursuant to § 3553(a). See Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714–15 
(2008).  
134  Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 93. 
135  See id.  
136  See id. 
137  Joint Appendix Vol. 1 at 73, 74, Kimbrough v. United States, 522 U.S. 85 (2007). 
138  Joint Appendix Vol. 1 at 75. 
139  See United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App’x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006).  
140  See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 96. 
141  Id. at 95. 
142  Id. at 96. 
143  Id. 
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offenses.”144 This failure on the Commission’s part diminished the reliability of the 
resulting guidelines, which in turn increased judges’ authority to deviate from them. 
Because the drug guidelines did not “exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its 
characteristic institutional role,” judges were permitted to vary from them, even in a 
“mine-run” case.145 
The Supreme Court sent an important message in Kimbrough: Congress’ failure 
to enact evidence-based reform authorized district court judges to ignore the 
crack/powder disparity and to make discretionary sentencing decisions in individual 
cases. The Court exhaustively detailed Congress’ intransigence in the face of the 
Commission’s decades-long efforts to eliminate or reduce the disparity. In 1995, the 
Commission recommended a 1:1 ratio to Congress, but Congress rejected it.146 The 
Commission continued to urge Congress to reduce the disparity in the years that 
followed.147 In a 2002 report to Congress, the Commission explained why the 
disparity was so problematic, and emphasized that the disparity “fails to meet the 
sentencing objectives set forth by Congress in both the Sentencing Reform Act and 
the 1986 Act.”148 Finally, in 2007, the Commission took action on its own, reducing 
the base offense level for crack cocaine by two levels, while acknowledging that a 
“comprehensive solution” required Congressional action.149  
Although Kimbrough clearly expanded judicial sentencing discretion, it left 
important questions unanswered. One was whether judges could vary from the 
guidelines based on a “policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on an 
individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular 
case.”150 In Spears v. United States, the Supreme Court answered this question in the 
affirmative, confirming that individual judges could substitute their own ratio to 
correct the crack/powder disparity.151 
Another post-Kimbrough question was whether a judge could disagree on 
policy grounds with a guideline that was the product of a congressional directive, 
such as the career offender guideline or fast-track guideline. Most circuits 
 
144  Id. at 96. 
145  See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109–10. 
146  See id. at 99. 
147  See id. at 99–100. 
148  Id. at 97 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY (2002)).  
149  Id. at 100 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY (2007)).  
150  Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009).  
151  Id. at 265. The judge in Spears determined that the proper ratio for crack/powder is 20-to-1. 
See id. at 266. 
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determined that sentencing judges had the discretion to do so.152 But in the career 
offender context, the Eleventh Circuit and the Seventh Circuit disagreed. The 
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court had drawn an explicit distinction 
between the way the guidelines treated crack and powder cocaine—which Congress 
did not direct—and the guidelines’ harsh punishment of career offenders—which 
Congress expressly directed.153 The Seventh Circuit agreed in United States v. 
Welton.154 On petition for a writ of certiorari, the Solicitor General confessed error, 
concluding that the Eleventh Circuit’s holding was inconsistent with Booker and 
Kimbrough.155 The Solicitor General recommended that the court grant the petition, 
vacate the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment, and remand for further proceedings, which 
the Supreme Court did. Accordingly, it is now settled law that district judges can 
categorically disagree on policy grounds with the career offender guideline—or any 
other guideline that is the product of a congressional directive. 
 
III. EFFORTS TO REFORM FEDERAL DRUG LAWS 
 
A. The Problem of High Pretrial Detention Rates in Drug Cases 
 
Just as the drug statutes and guidelines have contributed to high sentences at 
the back end, the BRA’s provisions that favor detention in drug cases have driven 
high federal pretrial detention rates at the front end.156 In 2017, the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts published the first study to examine the effect of the 
presumptions of detention on pretrial detention rates since the BRA’s passage.157 
That AO study found that, from 1995 to 2010, the percentage of people charged with 
drug offenses who were detained pretrial increased from 76% to 84%.158 Moreover, 
the AO study shows that the presumption of detention has become “an almost de 
 
152  See Tom McKay, Judicial Discretion to Consider Sentencing Disparities Created by Fast-
Track Programs: Resolving the Post-Kimbrough Circuit Split, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1423, 1445 (2011) 
(outlining the career offender circuit split); Alison Siegler, Disparities and Discretion in Fast-Track 
Sentencing, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 299, 300 (2009) (describing the fast-track circuit split). 
153  United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009). 
154  583 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 2009). 
155  See Brief for the United States at 10, Vazquez v. United States, 558 U.S. 1144 (2010) (No. 
09-5370). 
156  See Austin, supra note 17, at 52 (“Since 1984, the pretrial detention rate for federal 
defendants has been steadily increasing. Recent work has aimed to address why the detention rate 
continues to rise and if there may be alternatives that could slow or reverse this trend. The presumption 
for detention statute, which assumes that defendants charged with certain offenses should be detained, 
has been identified as one potential factor contributing to the rising detention rate.”); see also Siegler 
Written Statement, supra note 15, at 13, 16. 
157  See Austin, supra note 17, at 53. 
158  Id. 
2020  FED. JUD. DRUG LAW REF. ERA OF CONG. DYS. 305 
facto detention order in almost half of all federal cases” and “has contributed to a 
massive increase in the federal pretrial detention rate, with all of the social and 
economic costs associated with high rates of incarceration.”159 
This is far from what the BRA intended. Congress enacted the presumption of 
detention to “detain high-risk defendants who were likely to pose a significant risk 
of danger to the community”160 and “major drug traffickers” who were likely to flee 
if released.161 The AO study found that the presumption has strayed from “its 
intended purpose” of “detaining high-risk” individuals who are “likely to pose a 
significant danger to the community,” and instead over-incarcerates low-risk 
defendants.162 For example, when a low-risk individual is not facing a presumption 
of detention, they are released 94% of the time.163 Yet an identically low-risk 
individual in a presumption case is released just 68% of the time.164 All in all, the 
drug presumption is a “poorly defined attempt to identify high-risk defendants based 
primarily on their charge.”165 
The AO study led the Judicial Conference to ask Congress to eliminate the 
presumption in most drug cases because it was “unnecessarily increasing detention 
rates of low-risk defendants.”166 Specifically, the Judicial Conference recommended 
that Congress limit the drug presumption to people with very serious criminal 
records.167 In reiterating this recommendation in 2020, the Judicial Conference 
explained: “This provision reduces unnecessary pretrial detention of certain low-risk 
defendants charged with drug trafficking offenses by limiting the application of the 
presumption of detention to defendants whose criminal history suggests that they 
pose a higher risk of failing to appear . . . or that they may be a danger to the 
community.”168 This recommendation implies that the federal judiciary’s policy-
making body does not believe that all individuals subject to the presumption 
automatically pose a danger to the community. Yet Congress has taken no action on 
 
159  Id. at 61. 
160  Id. at 56–57.  
161  See supra Part I (discussing the legislative history of the drug presumption). 
162  See Austin, supra note 17, at 56–57; see also Matthew G. Rowland, The Rising Federal 
Pretrial Detention Rate in Context, 82 FED. PROBATION 13, 18 (2018). 
163  Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 14 (citing Austin, supra note 17, at 57). 
164  Id. 
165  Austin, supra note 17, at 60. 
166  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10. 
167  See id. (recommending that the presumption apply only to people who “have previously been 
convicted of two or more offenses described in subsection [3142](f)(1),” which are limited to drug, 
gun, terrorism, minor victim, and certain violent offenses). 
168  See 2020 Judicial Conference Letter, supra note 8, at Enclosure 2 at 2. 
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either recommendation, and the drug presumption of detention continues to apply to 
most federal drug cases around the country. 
As the Judicial Conference has recognized, high detention rates come with 
significant costs.169 While one of the BRA’s rationales for pretrial detention is the 
protection of the community, evidence shows that detention is more likely to 
increase crime than prevent it. A 2017 study found that although pretrial detention 
reduces a person’s criminal activity in the short term, “by eighteen months post-
hearing, detention is associated with a 30% increase in new felony charges and a 
20% increase in new misdemeanor charges,” which is consistent with other research 
that “even short-term detention has criminogenic effects.”170 Moreover, data shows 
that pretrial detention—even for a few days—is correlated with higher rates of 
recidivism.171 This finding is especially concerning as people are spending a longer 
time in jail awaiting trial.172  
Evidence from the state and federal systems demonstrates that pretrial detention 
hurts people and communities in other ways as well. People who are detained are 
more likely to “lose their jobs, their homes, their health, and even their children” 
than those who are released.173 On the job front, a recent study found that people 
who were released on bail had much better employment outcomes in the formal 
employment market.174 People who are detained are less likely to find a job or have 
any income, and have lower incomes if they are employed.175 Pretrial detention also 
contributes to housing instability and homelessness. A Federal Probation study 
found that of those detained less than three days, 29.9% reported that their housing 
situation became less stable; the number rose to 37.2% for those detained more than 
three days.176  
 
169  See id.  
170  Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 
STAN. L. REV. 711, 718 (2017); see also Arpit Gupta, et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence 
from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471 (2016). 
171  See CHRISTOPHER L. LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION, THE 
ARNOLD FOUNDATION 19 (2013). In the study, people who were detained were 1.3 times more likely to 
recidivate compared to people released on bail at some point before trial. Id. 
172  Austin, supra note 17, at 53–54 (“As of 2016, the average period of pretrial detention for a 
pretrial defendant had reached 255 days, although several districts average over 400 days in pretrial 
detention.”). 
173  Alison Siegler & Erica Zunkel, Rethinking Federal Bail Advocacy to Change the Culture of 
Detention, THE CHAMPION, at 5 (July 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3601230 [hereinafter Rethinking 
Federal Bail Advocacy]. 
174  See Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and 
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 227 (2018). 
175  See id.  
176  Alexander M. Holsinger & Kristi Holsinger, Analyzing Bond Supervision Survey Data: The 
Effects of Pretrial Detention on Self-Reported Outcomes, 82 FED. PROBATION 39, 42 (2018). 
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Finally, pretrial detention contributes to worse case outcomes. A detained 
person may feel pressure to “plead guilty to get out of jail, or accept an overly 
punitive plea deal because detention impaired her ability to gather evidence or meet 
with her lawyer. She may be less motivated to fight the charges when the fixed costs 
of incarceration have already been paid: stigma, loss of employment, housing or 
child care, etc.”177 Research also shows that in the federal system, pretrial detention 
“significantly increases sentences, decreases the probability that a defendant will 
receive a below-Guidelines sentence, and decreases the probability that they will 
avoid a mandatory minimum if facing one.”178 
These sweeping collateral consequences are particularly problematic in light of 
data that people in the federal system are extremely unlikely to commit new crimes 
on bond or fail to appear in court.179 As we have highlighted elsewhere, over 98% 
of people released in federal cases do not commit new crimes on release, and 99% 
appear for court.180 This data proves that “when release increases, crime and flight 
do not,”181 strongly suggesting that judges should do as we propose and safely 
release more people on bail.  
 
B. Federal Drug Laws 
 
Federal judges are particularly well situated to drive drug law reform because 
they have long been vocal about the problems with federal drug laws, in particular 
mandatory minimums and statutory recidivist enhancements. It is hard to think of a 
topic about which federal judges have been more outspoken—from Supreme Court 
justices to district court judges. In calling on federal judges to speak out against mass 
incarceration, Judge Jed Rakoff observed: “On one issue—opposition to mandatory 
minimum laws—the federal judiciary has been consistent in its opposition and clear 
in its message.”182 In 2016, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer went before the 
House of Representatives’ Appropriations Subcommittee and lambasted mandatory 
minimums: “You want mandatory minimums? I’ve said publicly many times that I 
 
177  Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case 
Outcomes, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 512 (2018) (finding that pretrial detention leads to a 13% increase 
“in the likelihood of being convicted on at least one charge.”). 
178  Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The Immediate Consequences of Pretrial Detention, 30 AM. L. 
ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2020); see also Austin, supra note 17, at 53–54 (citing studies that show 
worse case outcomes when people are detained pretrial). 
179  See Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 4. 
180  See Siegler & Zunkel, Rethinking Federal Bail Advocacy, supra note 173, at 3 
(demonstrating that “this near-perfect compliance rate is seen equally in federal districts with very high 
release rates and those with very low release rates”); ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Judicial Business: Federal 
Pretrial Services Tables, Table H-15 (2019), https://perma.cc/LYG4-AX4H.  
181  Siegler & Zunkel, Rethinking Federal Bail Advocacy, supra note 173, at 3–4. 
182  Rakoff, supra note 29. 
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think they’re a terrible idea.”183 Retired Justice Anthony Kennedy told the American 
Bar Association in 2003: “I can accept neither the necessity nor the wisdom of 
federal mandatory minimums. In too many cases, mandatory minimum sentences 
are unwise and unjust.”184  
Federal judges have assailed drug mandatory minimums in a variety of ways. 
Mandatory minimums “distort the sentencing process and mandate unjust 
sentences.”185 They discourage people from exercising their constitutional right to 
trial.186 They were created to punish high-level drug traffickers, but often do not.187 
The most culpable receive more lenient sentences because they can provide 
“substantial assistance” to the government, while the least culpable have little, if 
any, information of value.188 They disparately impact people of color.189 They take 
sentencing discretion from judges and give it to prosecutors.190 These critiques have 
come from judges with wide-ranging judicial philosophies. For example, in United 
States v. Brigham, Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook acknowledged the 
“troubling” nature of drug mandatory minimums that punish the least culpable most 
severely because “it accords with no one’s theory of appropriate punishments.”191  
 
183  Justices Anthony Kennedy & Stephen Breyer, Supreme Court Fiscal Year 2016 Budget (C-
SPAN User Created Clip Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4532246/user-clip-justices-
kennedy-breyer-criminal-justice.  
184  Justice Anthony Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting: An 
Address by Anthony M. Kennedy (Aug. 9, 2003), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo 
/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html.  
185  United States v. Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d 478, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
186  United States v. Bowen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50670 (E.D. La. 2012) (“The problem with 
mandatory minimums is that they have a coercive effect . . . . This extraordinary pressure can result in 
false cooperation and guilty pleas by innocent people.”). 
187  See, e.g., United States v. Leitch, 2013 WL 753445, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[M]any low-
level drug trafficking defendants are receiving the harsh mandatory minimums that Congress explicitly 
created only for leaders and managers of drug operations.”). 
188  See, e.g., Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 487. 
189  See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 772, 792 (E.D. Miss. 1994) (“[T]he ‘100 
to 1’ ratio, coupled with mandatory minimum sentencing provided by federal statute has created a 
situation that reeks with inhumanity and injustice. . . . [I]f young white males were being incarcerated 
at the same rate as young black males, the statute would have been amended long ago.”).  
190  See, e.g., Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (“The government simply dictated a five-year 
sentence without even having to allege, let alone prove, the aggravating fact that it implied warranted 
the sentence.”). 
191  977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Opinion: Justice Kennedy Speaks Out, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/12/opinion/justice-kennedy-speaks-
out.html (“Justice Kennedy said he could accept neither their ‘necessity’ nor their ‘wisdom.’ He is 
hardly alone, even among conservative[] [judges], in raising these objections.”).  
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In 2010, federal judges were surveyed about their views on drug mandatory 
minimum sentences and the results were overwhelmingly negative. Seventy-six 
percent responded that the crack cocaine mandatory minimum was too high; 54% 
responded that the marijuana mandatory minimum was too high; and approximately 
44% responded that the heroin, drug, and powder cocaine mandatory minimums 
were too high.192 By contrast, a majority of them responded that the mandatory 
minimums for firearms and child pornography production and distribution offenses 
were “appropriate.”193 
The Judicial Conference of the United States has long opposed mandatory 
minimums and supported legislative reform.194 In a 2013 letter to Congress, the 
Judicial Conference’s Criminal Law Committee stated: “For 60 years, the Judicial 
Conference has consistently and vigorously opposed mandatory minimum 
sentences” because they waste taxpayer dollars, produce “disproportionately severe 
sentences,” and “undermine confidence in the judicial system.”195 The letter 
highlighted drug mandatory minimums in particular as unfair because “the only 
considerations” are the type and amount of drugs.196 
Federal judges have also criticized recidivist drug enhancements that until 2018 
could increase mandatory minimums up to life imprisonment. (The FSA reduced 
and narrowed these recidivist enhancements, but left them on the books.) Retired 
District Court Judge John Gleeson observed that recidivist enhancements “coerce[] 
guilty pleas and produce[] sentences so excessively severe they take your breath 
away.”197 First Circuit Judge Gilbert Merritt condemned a prosecutor’s decision to 
double the 10-year mandatory minimum to 20 years in the case of a mentally-ill man 
whose offense was nonviolent, saying it “passe[d] all understanding.”198 Judge 
Merritt also highlighted Congress’ dysfunction on the drug law reform front in the 
face of sustained criticism: “[t]he Judicial Conference of the United States for almost 
20 years, and the Sentencing Commission for almost 10 years, have pleaded with 
 
192  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 (June 2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf.  
193  Id.  
194  See, e.g., Letter from Honorable Robert Holmes Bell to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, at 1 (Sept. 
17, 2013), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judge-bell-chairman-leahy-mandatory-minim 
ums.pdf. 
195  Id. at 1–2, 4. 
196  Id. at 5.  
197  United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The prior felony 
[§ 851] information ushered that 800-pound gorilla into the case at the eleventh hour and it took the 
case over. Once it was filed, everything that followed was done with all eyes on the draconian sentence 
that a jury’s verdict of guilty would require me to impose.”).  
198  United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 561 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (Merritt, J., concurring).  
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the judiciary committees of Congress to do something about the serious injustices 
that these long mandatory minimum sentences impose—to no avail.”199  
Beyond the federal judiciary, there is widespread agreement that federal 
mandatory minimum drug laws are inhumane, waste taxpayer money, and deprive 
judges of sentencing discretion. In a study done for the Pew Charitable Trusts, voters 
were asked their views about people who violate drug laws. Told that a large 
percentage of the people in federal prison are incarcerated for drug offenses, sixty-
one percent said, “[t]hat is too many drug criminals taking up too much space in our 
federal prison system. More of that space should be used for people who have 
committed acts of violence or terrorism.”200 The same study found that eight in ten 
voters support giving judges the flexibility to determine drug sentences based on the 
individualized facts of a case.201 
Despite the judiciary’s vocal opposition and public censure, Congress has not 
meaningfully reformed mandatory minimum drug laws since they were enacted 
nearly thirty years ago.202 The FSA tinkers around the edges of reform, but does not 
alter the 1986 Act’s original sin of pegging drug sentences to drug type and quantity, 
nor does it eliminate drug mandatory minimums.203 On the positive side, the FSA 
reduces and narrows harsh mandatory minimum recidivist enhancements,204 
expands the safety valve so that more people are eligible to receive a sentence below 
the mandatory minimum if they meet certain (still stringent) requirements,205 and 
makes the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive. 
 
199  Id.  
200  Mellman Group & Public Opinion Strategies, National Survey Key Findings—Federal 
Sentencing & Prisons, Pew Trusts, 1 (Feb. 10, 2016).  
201  Id. 
202  While it is beyond the scope of this article, the Department of Justice remains a consistent 
roadblock to drug law reform. See generally Rachel E. Barkow & Marc Osler, Designed to Fail: The 
President’s Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 387, 418, 421 (2017) (describing the Department of Justice’s “institutional biases in 
favor of the statute quo and avoiding any risk that someone released early might commit a dangerous 
offense” and its resistance to mandatory minimum reform because such penalties provide leverage to 
secure pleas and cooperation). 
203  First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 756, 132 Stat. 5194, 5202 (2018).  
204  The FSA made two changes. First, it changed the length of the enhancement. Previously, 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841 and 960 permitted prosecutors to seek a 20-year mandatory minimum if the person had 
one prior conviction for a “felony drug offense” (including simple possession) and a mandatory 
minimum of life if the person had two of those convictions, no matter how old. The new mandatory 
minimums are reduced to 15 years and 25 years respectively. Second, the FSA changed the definition 
of what type of offense qualifies for an increased mandatory minimum sentence. Now, only prior 
convictions for a “serious drug felony” or a “serious violent felony” count. See First Step Act of 2018, 
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 756, 132 Stat. 5194, 5202 (2018).  
205  Prosecutors have an important say in who receives safety valve relief. The guidelines provide 
that a person must “truthfully provide[] to the Government all information and evidence the defendant 
has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common 
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Certainly, the FSA has ameliorated problems at the margins and is better than 
nothing. Moreover, reformers have talked earnestly about the FSA being just that—
a “first step”—with plans to push additional reform.206 Yet, the politics of federal 
criminal justice reform remain complicated. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AK) was a 
vocal critic of the First Step Act and nearly succeeded in defeating the bill. While 
lobbying against it, he called for increasing drug sentences.207 Senator Cotton also 
slammed prior iterations of federal criminal reform, calling them “criminal 
leniency” bills.208 He is sure to be a critic of any future bills. Senator John Kennedy 
(R-LA) issued a statement explaining why he opposed the FSA: “[T]he most 
important goal of the criminal justice system for American families is justice. This 
bill is backwards. It favors criminals over victims. It forgets that the ultimate goal is 
justice. We’ve seen what’s happened with so-called criminal justice reform in 
Louisiana. People are literally getting killed.”209 Even conservatives condemned 
Senator Kennedy’s opposition to the FSA as “all wrong.”210 
Senator Cotton and Senator Kennedy’s comments are not surprising. National 
politicians traditionally have benefitted from being tough on crime and stoking fears 
about easing criminal laws, no matter how misguided those laws are.211 Senator Ted 
Cruz (R-TX) is a recent example. In 2015, he “criticized ‘draconian mandatory 
minimum sentences’ and bragged about supporting [the] bill that would cut them in 
 
scheme or plan.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2(a)(5) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018). The safety valve guideline squarely permits a prosecutor to withhold a recommendation for 
relief—and, as a result, a sentence below the mandatory minimum—if she determines that the person 
has not been truthful. See id.; see also United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(discussing the truthful disclosure prong).  
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-
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Help, USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/11/15/tom-cotton-
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211  See RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS 110–12 (2019). 
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half for federal drug offenders.”212 His tune changed considerably after he launched 
his 2016 presidential bid. He became one of most vocal critics of the Sentencing 
Reform and Corrections Act, which was a precursor bill to the FSA.213 This type of 
politics is not just the province of Republicans. “Everybody in politics exploits race 
and crime, Democrats as much as Republicans, including, of course, Bill Clinton—
who took time off his campaign for president to go back to Arkansas to preside over 
the execution of a mentally defective black prisoner.”214 
The year 2020 may hold promise for criminal reform more generally. In the 
wake of George Floyd’s death and nationwide protests calling for systemic change, 
federal politicians have introduced bills to reform policing215 and a bipartisan bill 
that makes modest reforms to releasing elderly and sick people from prison.216 They 
would be wise to focus on drug law reform. The continued use of federal mandatory 
minimum drug laws diminishes respect for the system and its players, including law 
enforcement.217  
 
IV. THE PATH FORWARD: A MORE VOCAL JUDICIARY 
 
As of 2020, the federal criminal law reform landscape remains challenging, and 
the system continues to single out drug offenses for harsh treatment at the bail and 
sentencing stages.  
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2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/opinion/mandatory-minimum-sentences-protest.html 
(“Reforms to eliminate mandatory minimums and rein in prosecutorial overreaching are vital to 
comprehensively reforming our overly punitive criminal justice systems, whose harshness 
disproportionately affects communities of color.”); Scott Hechinger, How Mandatory Minimums 
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the establishment of mandatory-minimum sentences . . . have only further diminished the connection 
between community sentiment and criminal punishment.”). 
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At the front end, federal bail reform efforts in Congress have been virtually 
non-existent. Federal legislators have pushed for states to reform their bail systems 
while ignoring the federal pretrial detention crisis at their doorstep.218 For example, 
in 2017, Senators Kamala Harris (D-CA) and Rand Paul (R-KY) introduced the 
Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act to encourage states “to reform or replace the bail 
system.”219 In an op-ed supporting their legislation, Harris and Paul highlighted the 
importance of bail reform, but did not once mention the high federal pretrial 
detention rate or possible reforms, such as eliminating or narrowing the drug 
presumption as the Judicial Conference has recommended.220 Likewise, Senator 
Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced the No Money Bail Act in 2018 to end money bail 
in the federal system. However, this bill would have had little impact because federal 
law already specifically prohibits a judge from imposing a financial condition that 
results in pretrial jailing.221 In a heartening development, the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security held a hearing on 
federal and state bail reform last fall.222 Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) 
highlighted the rising federal pretrial detention rate and commented that “surely 
community safety does not justify this trend.”223 What this hearing portends for 
future reform is an open question. 
At the back end, there is a real danger that momentum for the “second step” of 
federal drug law reform will stall and there will be no political will to revisit federal 
mandatory minimums for decades into the future. As President Trump said during a 
2020 Super Bowl ad, “I got it done, and the people in this room got it done,”224 
suggesting that there is no work left to do. Of course, defense attorneys and 
reformers should continue to make arguments against mandatory minimums in drug 
cases, and most certainly will. But they cannot make those arguments alone.  
To fill the void left by Congress’ inaction, judges should use their discretion at 
the bail and sentencing stages of a drug case to effectuate reform and reduce mass 
 
218  See Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 1 (“The federal pretrial detention system is 
in crisis, too, but its problems have been largely overlooked, even by federal legislators.”).   
219  Kamala Harris & Rand Paul, To Shrink Jails, Let’s Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-bail.html.  
220  See id.  
221  See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that 
results in the pretrial detention of the person.”). 
222  See Administration of Bail by State and Federal Courts: A Call for Reform: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th 
Cong. (Nov. 14, 2019) [hereinafter House Bail Hearing], https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/ 
eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2256. 
223  House Bail Hearing, supra note 222, at 51:35. 
224  Catherine Kim, Trump’s Criminal Justice Record is More Complicated Than He Claims, 
VOX (Feb. 5, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/5/21124047/trump-speech-sotu-
criminal-justice-record.  
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incarceration. At the front end, they should make evidence-based decisions that 
account for the fiscal and human costs of pretrial detention and use their considerable 
discretion to release more people on bond. This includes closely scrutinizing any 
government request for temporary pretrial detention at the initial appearance hearing 
and giving little weight to the presumption of detention at the detention hearing. On 
the back end, judges should lodge categorical policy disagreements with the drug 
sentencing guideline and the career offender sentencing guideline using 
Kimbrough’s blueprint. At both stages, judges should issue written opinions that 
highlight the evidence supporting reform.  
 
A. Advancing Bail Reform by Encouraging the Release of More People on Bond 
 
Judges should work to counteract the BRA’s over-detention of people charged 
with drug offenses without waiting for Congress to change the law. As discussed in 
Part I, the BRA permits prosecutors to request temporary detention at the initial 
appearance hearing if the person is charged with a drug offense that has a maximum 
term of imprisonment of ten years or more.225 The BRA also mandates a presumption 
of detention in those cases.226 As discussed in Part II, supra, the legislative history 
of the drug presumption shows that legislators intended it to apply to “major drug 
traffickers” with the financial means to flee. Senator Chiles, one of the strongest 
proponents of the drug presumption, conceded that “[o]ften a person who has been 
arrested for drug dealing may not be dangerous in the sense that he is likely to rob 
or kill someone.”227 Data shows that the presumption is not working as legislators 
intended, and the Judicial Conference has recommended that Congress eliminate it 
in most cases. It is unclear when Congress will take action, if ever. 
To counteract Congress’ dysfunction and promote reform, judges should 
release more people charged with drug offenses. The pretrial detention rates are 
simply too high. They do not reflect what legislators intended and they do not 
promote the BRA’s goals. The BRA gives judges ample discretion to make release 
decisions, even when a person is subject to the presumption. To effectuate higher 
release rates in drug cases, judges should take two important steps. 
First, at the initial appearance stage, judges should closely scrutinize 
prosecutors’ requests for temporary detention in drug cases. The BRA does not 
require temporary detention in drug cases; it is only triggered “upon motion of the 
attorney for the Government.”228 The data on rising pretrial detention rates strongly 
suggest that prosecutors are moving for detention in too many cases. Since 2006, 
federal prosecutors’ national detention request rates have ranged from 60% to 
 
225  See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C). 
226  See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). 
227  1981 Hearings, supra note 42, at 59. 
228  18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1). 
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65%.229 Prosecutors consistently request detention at higher rates than Pretrial 
Services.230 During that same time period, judges responded by detaining more 
people, and by 2018 their detention rates were within two percentage points of the 
prosecutors’ request rates (61% and 63%, respectively).231 In 2019, judges’ 
detention rates finally leveled off at 61% even as prosecutors’ request rates spiked 
to 65%, their highest point in the public data.232 Rather than being swayed by 
prosecutors’ harsh approach to bond, judges should follow the evidence-based 
approach suggested in this paper.   
Just because prosecutors can move for detention does not mean they should. If 
prosecutors make a motion for temporary detention, judges should ask them to 
explain why they are moving for temporary detention, particularly if available 
information suggests that the person poses a low risk of flight or danger. Especially 
when the person played a small role in the overall drug operation or has little to no 
criminal history, a judge should propose release conditions that they believe would 
reasonably assure the person’s safety and appearance, and should ask the prosecutor 
to consider withdrawing their detention request. If the prosecutor persists in seeking 
detention the judge is required to detain the person temporarily, but the judge can 
still remind the prosecutor that temporary detention in a drug case is a discretionary 
call by the prosecutor. The judge can also emphasize that, under the BRA, release is 
the norm and detention is the “carefully-limited exception.”233  
Second, at the detention hearing stage, judges should give the drug presumption 
little weight in the overall detention analysis. Judges can explain that the drug 
presumption is not working as legislators intended by citing the legislative history 
discussed in Part I, supra, and the AO study discussed in Part III, supra. The 
legislative history shows that Congress intended the drug presumption to apply to 
kingpin traffickers, not virtually every person charged with a federal drug offense. 
Furthermore, legislators intended the presumption to apply to people who were 
 
229  ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Judicial Business: Federal Pretrial Services Tables, Table H-3A 
(Sept. 30, 2006–Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/data-table-numbers/h-3a. 
230  Id.  
231  See ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Judicial Business: Federal Pretrial Services Tables, Table H-
14A (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_h14a_0930.2018.pdf 
(showing nationwide judicial detention rate of 61% in 2018); ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Judicial Business: 
Federal Pretrial Services Tables, Table H-3A (Sept. 30, 18), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/data_tables/jb_h3a_0930.2018.pdf (showing nationwide AUSA detention request rate of 
63% in 2018). 
232  See ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Judicial Business: Federal Pretrial Services Tables, Table H-
14A (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_h14a_0930.2019.pdf 
(showing nationwide judicial detention rate of 61% in 2019); ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Judicial Business: 
Federal Pretrial Services Tables, Table H-3A (Sept. 30, 19), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/data_tables/jb_h3a_0930.2019.pdf (showing nationwide AUSA detention request rate of 65% in 
2019). 
233  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.  
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highly likely to flee. But the AO study shows that the presumption does not correlate 
with dangerousness or flight risk.234 Instead, the presumption over-detains the 
lowest-risk offenders in the system and has “a negligible effect on the highest-risk 
defendants.”235 The AO study is a gold mine for judges who want an evidence-based 
reason to detain fewer people in presumption cases. After all, the federal judiciary’s 
own policy-making body has repeatedly relied on the study to conclude that the 
presumption sweeps far too broadly and should apply only to drug offenders with 
serious priors.236 Despite the strength of the study and recommendation, only one 
federal judge has ever cited the AO study in a written opinion237 and no judge has 
cited the Judicial Conference’s recommendation. That should also change. 
Judicial action is especially important in light of the COVID-19 pandemic that 
is ravaging federal jails and prisons.238 While Attorney General William J. Barr has 
recommended releasing people from federal prisons to home confinement, “he has 
directed his federal prosecutors . . . to largely oppose releasing people from federal 
jails,” purportedly to advance community safety.239 But, as we have argued 
elsewhere, COVID-19 changes “the safety-of-the-community calculus,”240 
especially in light of data showing that people released on bond do not commit new 
 
234  Austin, supra note 17, at 62 (“[T]he presumption has failed to correctly identify defendants 
who are most likely to be rearrested for any offense, rearrested for a violent offense, fail to appear, or 
be revoked for technical violations.”). 
235  Austin, supra note 17, at 57, 60; Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 14.   
236  The Judicial Conference’s 2017 recommendation reads as follows (new language 
underlined): “(3) Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed that no condition or 
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the 
safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the 
person committed (A) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is 
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import 
and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46 and such person has previously been 
convicted of two or more offenses described in subsection (f)(1) of this section, or two or more state 
or local offenses that would have been offenses described in subsection (f)(1) of this section if a 
circumstance giving rise to federal jurisdiction had existed, or a combination of such offenses. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. The same language is proposed in the 2020 recommendation. 
See 2020 Judicial Conference Letter, supra note 8, at Enclosure 2 at 2.  
237  See United States v. Sexton, No. 1:19-cr-17, 2019 WL 1318344, at *2 (D. Utah 2019) 
(quoting the AO study’s finding that the drug presumption is “overly broad”). 
238  See, e.g., Timothy Williams et al., Coronavirus Cases Rise Sharply in Prisons Even as They 
Plateau Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/us/ 
coronavirus-inmates-prisons-jails.html. 
239  Alison Siegler & Erica Zunkel, Commentary: Don’t Let Chicago’s Federal Jail Become the 
Next Coronavirus Hot Spot, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/ 
commentary/ct-opinion-coronavirus-jail-cook-county-mcc-20200424-zagv2nvjyzcrvknxbfasusx63a-
story.html.  
240  Id.  
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crimes or fail to appear in court.241 Judges should use their discretion to release more 
people on bond during the COVID-19 pandemic to protect people charged with 
crimes and their communities.242  
 
B. Advancing Reform by Lodging Policy Disagreements with the Drug Sentencing 
Guidelines and the Career Offender Guideline 
 
Judges should also advance reform at the sentencing stage by lodging policy 
disagreements with the drug guidelines and the career offender guideline and 
varying from them, even in “mine-run” cases. Judges should articulate their policy 
disagreements in written opinions. “The published judicial opinion is the ‘heart of 
the common law system,’” and is “critical to what we understand to be the ‘law.’”243 
Moreover, judges “ensure the legitimacy of their decisions by preparing and 
publishing opinions that explain and justify their reasoning.”244 By issuing written 
opinions that disagree with the guidelines in drug cases, judges “reform sentencing 
on their own”245 and develop sentencing common law until Congress changes the 
laws. 
Kimbrough “generated a tsunami to the ongoing sea change in federal 
sentencing” because, for the first time, the Supreme Court authorized judges to vary 
from the drug guidelines, even without a showing that the person’s individual case 
was mitigated or extraordinary.246 In so doing, the Court put down a post-Booker 
mutiny by seven federal courts of appeals.247 In Spears, the Supreme Court had to 
step in once again to affirm that it meant what it said in Kimbrough: “That was 
indeed the point of Kimbrough: a recognition of district courts’ authority to vary 
from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them, and not 
simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive 
sentence in a particular case.”248 
Since Kimbrough, however, only a small number of judges “invok[e] . . . policy 
disagreements with the guidelines and policy statements to help ameliorate the 
 
241  Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 4. 
242  Id.  
243  Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the 
Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. 
U.L. REV. 757, 757 (1995) (quoting John Reid, Doe Did Not Sit—The Creation of Opinions by an 
Artist, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 59 (1963)). 
244  Id.  
245  Jelani Jefferson Exum, Giving Guidance to the Guidelines, 68 S.C. L. REV. 453, 461 (2017). 
246  Bennett, supra note 9, at 892. 
247  See Siegler, Rebellion, supra note 122, at 203 & n.15. 
248  Spears v. United States, 551 U.S. 261, 264 (2009). 
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harshness of the guidelines in general, especially in drug cases.”249 That is troubling 
in light of Kimbrough and Spears’ clear holding that judges have the discretion to 
disagree with the guidelines on policy grounds, even if it creates “variations between 
district courts.”250 Former federal district court judge Mark Bennett has posited 
many reasons why judges are reluctant to question the guidelines: fear of reversal, 
concerns about sentencing uniformity, the guidelines’ “strong cognitive anchoring 
effect,” and a consequence of judges giving the Commission “far too much credit” 
for creating guidelines based on empirical research and prior national experience.251  
Right after Kimbrough, two appellate judges warned that issuing policy 
disagreements with the guidelines would have disastrous results. Judge Michael 
Fisher urged judges not to use their discretion under Kimbrough to “blaze new 
sentencing trails” because it could “result in disparate sentences and, ultimately, 
legislative backlash that would strip the federal judiciary of its . . . discretion.”252 
Judge Thomas Hardiman concurred: “Congress might impose new, detailed 
statutory penalties that will leave district [court] judges with even less discretion 
than they possessed in the mandatory Guidelines era.”253 Thankfully, these 
doomsday predictions have not come to pass.  
Contrary to that perspective, Kimbrough both advanced racial justice and is a 
prime example of how the federal judiciary can promote reform through the common 
law process.  
First, Kimbrough sent a clear message to Congress that the federal judiciary 
had concerns about the disparity. People had advocated for decades to eliminate the 
crack/powder disparity, which was seen as racially biased from its inception and 
perpetuated differential sentencing treatment based on race.254 While advocacy 
 
249  Bennett, supra note 9, at 904. 
250  Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 107–08 (“These measures will not eliminate variations between 
district courts, but our opinion in Booker recognized that some departures from uniformity were a 
necessary cost of the remedy we adopted.”); see also Siegler, Rebellion, supra note 122, at 220–21 
(responding to misplaced concerns that increased judicial discretion creates unwarranted sentencing 
disparities). 
251  Bennett, supra note 9, at 906–08.  
252  Id. at 908–09 (citing D. Michael Fisher, Striking a Balance: The Need to Temper Judicial 
Discretion Against a Background of Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 65 
(2007)). 
253  Id. at 913 (citing Thomas M. Hardiman & Richard L. Heppner Jr., Policy Disagreements 
with the United States Sentencing Guidelines: A Welcome Expansion of Judicial Discretion or the 
Beginning of the End of the Sentencing Guidelines?, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 5 (2012)). 
254  See, e.g., NAACP, Press Release: NAACP Applauds Steps Taken by US Sentencing 
Commission to Begin Addressing Crack/Powder Cocaine Sentencing Disparities (Nov. 16, 2007), 
https://www.naacp.org/latest/naacp-applauds-steps-taken-by-us-sentencing-commission-to-begin-
addressing-crack-powder-cocaine-sentencing-disparities/. In the early days, people attacked the 
disparity by alleging racially selective prosecution in crack cases, but the Supreme Court quelled that 
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efforts were of course critical to the Fair Sentencing Act’s passage, Congress 
changed the law only after the Supreme Court concluded in Kimbrough that the 
disparity was based on erroneous assumptions, not evidence.255 Approximately two 
years after Kimbrough, Congress reduced the disparity in the Fair Sentencing Act 
and the Commission amended the drug guidelines to reflect the new law.256 During 
debate on the Fair Sentencing Act, the House Committee on the Judiciary cited 
Kimbrough, noting that the Court had made “a fundamental change in how Federal 
judges apply sentencing guidelines regarding cocaine” and that federal judges could 
now impose “more reasonable sentences” in crack cases.257 
Second, Kimbrough confirmed that federal district court judges had the 
discretion to disagree with the disparity, and judges used this discretion to reduce 
sentences accordingly. Kimbrough thus provides the federal judiciary with a 
blueprint for continued reform of the drug guidelines and the career offender 
guideline. 
 
1. Categorical Policy Disagreements with the Drug Sentencing Guidelines 
 
Judges should promote reform by categorically disagreeing with the drug 
guidelines in written opinions. As discussed above, the Supreme Court explicitly 
approved this approach in Kimbrough and Spears. Moreover, policy disagreements 
are “healthy” and promote “the process of constantly improving” the guidelines, 
which “were intended to be evolutionary in nature.”258 Policy disagreements are 
particularly important when the Commission and Congress are not engaging in 
dialogue about sentencing policy, and the Commission simply “‘accept[s] and 
incorporate[s]’ the mandatory minimums ‘wholesale into the guideline structure 
without the Commission’s independent analysis.’”259 One judge described issuing 
policy disagreements with the drug guidelines as an imperative: “Critically 
evaluating the crack/cocaine ratio in terms of its fealty to the purposes of the 
Sentencing Reform Act is not optional. It is not something that a judge has discretion 
to do or not do. The Supreme Court in Kimbrough and Spears held that an advisory 
 
litigation strategy by setting an insuperable discovery standard in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 
456 (1996). 
255  Kimbrough, 522 U.S. at 95–96. 
256  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPACT OF THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT 
OF 2010, at 5–6 (Aug. 2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-
testimony-and-reports/drug-topics/201507_RtC_Fair-Sentencing-Act.pdf#page=8. 
257  H.R. REP. NO. 111-670, pt. 1, at 14 (2010). 
258  United States v. Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1031 (N.D. Iowa 2013); United States v. Diaz, 
2013 WL 322243, at *8. 
259  Diaz, 2013 WL 322243, at *16. 
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Guideline system required it.”260 Finally, it is imperative for judges to highlight the 
racial disparities that mandatory minimums and the drug guidelines have produced 
for the last three decades.261 
Kimbrough focused on the problems with the crack cocaine guideline, but the 
same arguments apply to other drugs as well. For example, judges have railed against 
the drug guidelines’ misguided use of drug type and quantity as a proxy for 
culpability. “The structural flaw is easily traced. It is rooted directly in the fateful 
choice by the original Commission to link the Guidelines ranges for all drug 
trafficking defendants to the onerous mandatory minimum penalties in the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 . . . that were expressly intended for only a few.”262 Former 
Judge Bennett points out that “a whopping 83.1% of the meth defendants in federal 
court faced a mandatory minimum sentence even though the vast majority were not 
kingpins,” because “quantity is a poor proxy for most meth defendants’ criminal 
culpability.”263 The drug guidelines also call for increased punishment in 
methamphetamine cases based on purity. This distinction is not based on empirical 
evidence, careful study, or national experience. “While it may seem logical to punish 
a pure substance more than [a] mixed substance, there is no support in the legislative 
history to explain the formula underlying greater methamphetamine purity to greater 
months of imprisonment.”264 These are all legitimate bases for categorical policy 
disagreements with the drug guidelines. 
Judges have the discretion to vary from the drug guidelines based on a 
categorical policy disagreement, even in a “mine-run” case, and then consider 
 
260  United States v. Whigham, 754 F. Supp. 2d 239, 247 (D. Mass. 2010); see also Exum, supra 
note 245, at 463 (describing conversations with judges in which they expressed “highly critical 
perceptions . . . of the drug Guidelines,” such as “drug sentences are out of control,” “drug Guidelines 
are out of whack,” and “Guidelines are obsessed with drug quantities”).  
261  Rakoff, supra note 29 (“And whom are we locking up? Mostly young men of color.”); Radley 
Balko, Opinion: There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal Justice System is Racist. Here’s 
the Proof., WASH. POST (June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/ 
systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-justice-system/. 
262  Diaz, 2013 WL 322243 at *1; United States v. Cabrera, 567 F. Supp. 2d 271, 275 (D. Mass. 
2008) (varying downward and rejecting the cocaine guideline because of “the over-emphasis on 
quantity and under-emphasis on role in the offense”). 
263  Bennett, supra note 9, at 902. Methamphetamine offenses continue to be charged and 
sentenced at a higher rate than all other drug offenses. 2019 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 108, Table 
D-1 (methamphetamine offenses constituted 42% of all drug offenses in Fiscal Year 2019). They are 
also the most severely punished, with an average sentence of 95 months. Id. at 124, Table D-3. 
264  Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1025; see also id. at 1031 (concluding that it is appropriate to 
reduce “the penalty by one third for methamphetamine offenses in response to the fundamental 
problems with the methamphetamine Guidelines range”). 
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aggravating and mitigating arguments under § 3553(a).265 Judges who have lodged 
categorical policy disagreements with the drug guidelines have fashioned various 
remedies for determining what kind of sentencing variance is appropriate. For crack 
cocaine, some judges have decided to apply a 1-to-1 ratio in all cases, in spite of 
Congress’ adoption of an 18-to-1 ratio.266 For methamphetamine, some judges have 
reduced the guidelines by one third “to account for the policy disagreement.”267 
Even with judge-crafted remedies and the Commission’s 2014 reduction of the 
drug quantity levels across the board, 268 the drug guidelines remains flawed and in 
need of reform. As it is, judges vary below the guidelines in drug cases 
approximately 33% of the time,269 excluding substantial assistance departures. This 
is a clear indication that judges believe that, in at least one third of all federal cases, 
the drug guidelines do not properly calibrate sentencing ranges and leads to 
sentences that do not fulfill § 3553(a)’s purposes. 
 
2. Categorical Policy Disagreements with the Career Offender Sentencing 
Guideline 
 
It is imperative that judges also issue categorical policy disagreements with the 
career offender guideline, especially for people with prior records for drugs instead 
of violence. The career offender guideline is another byproduct of the War on Drugs. 
 
265  See Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1031 (“[A]fter reducing the Guidelines range by one third to 
account for the policy disagreement, I will reserve the ability to adjust the figure upwards and 
downwards as I weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”).  
266  See, e.g., Whigham, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 246 (“I will apply a 1:1 ratio for all crack cocaine 
sentencings.”); United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637 (N.D. Iowa 2009); United States v. 
Lewis, 623 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D.D.C. 2009).  
267  Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.  
268  In 2014, the Commission voted unanimously to lower the drug guidelines “in order to help 
control federal prison costs and populations, ensure fair and just sentences, and protect public safety.” 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENSIBLE SENTENCING REFORM: THE 2014 REDUCTION OF DRUG SENTENCES 
(2014), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/backgrounders/profile 
2014drugamendment.pdf. While this across-the-board reduction was a step in the right direction, it did 
nothing to change or fix the underlying problems with the drug guidelines. See Diaz, 2013 WL 322243, 
at *1 (disagreeing with the drug guidelines on policy grounds and urging the Commission to “‘de-link’ 
the drug trafficking Guidelines ranges from the 1986 Act’s weight-driven mandatory minimum 
sentences and use its resources, knowledge, and expertise to fashion fair sentencing ranges for drug 
trafficking offenses.”). On the upside, data shows that the reduction did not lead to an increase in 
recidivism. The Commission found there was no statistically significant difference in the recidivism 
rates of people released early and a comparable group of people who served their full sentences. See 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RETROACTIVITY AND RECIDIVISM: THE DRUGS MINUS TWO AMENDMENT 1 
(July 2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publicat 
ions/2020/20200708Recidivism-Drugs-Minus-Two.pdf. This finding was consistent across all drug 
types. See id. at 6. 
269  2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 123.  
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It recommends astronomical sentences for people who have been convicted of a drug 
trafficking offense and who have two or more drug trafficking offenses on their 
record (referred to as “drug trafficking only” career offenders). In 2016, the 
Commission recommended that Congress amend the career offender statutory 
directive so that it no longer includes those who qualify as career offenders based 
solely on drug trafficking offenses.270 In theory, this should be a straightforward 
reform because it is supported by ample evidence, but Congress has failed to take 
action. Until Congress does, judges should promote reform by disagreeing with the 
career offender guideline on policy grounds in “drug trafficking only” career 
offender cases. To develop sentencing common law, judges should issue written 
opinions that discuss the evidence and explain the problems with applying the career 
offender guideline in such cases. 
The career offender provision applies to a person who commits a “controlled 
substance” offense or a “crime of violence” after two prior felony convictions for 
either one of those offenses.271 The guideline has draconian consequences: it 
increases all career offenders to Criminal History Category (“CHC”) VI and to 
offense levels at or near the statutory maximum penalty of the offense of 
conviction.272 The guideline defines a “controlled substance” offense broadly.273 
Likewise, career offender predicate convictions bafflingly include misdemeanors 
and convictions that result in no jail or prison time.274 As a result, very low-level 
offenders who have never before been incarcerated face extremely long sentences if 
they fall within the career offender guideline’s net. 
The career offender guideline is the Commission’s response to a part of the 
SRA that requires sentences for recidivist offenders to be “at or near the maximum 
term.”275 Congress was particularly concerned with “repeat drug traffickers,” noting 
during debate on the SRA that drug trafficking was an “extremely lucrative” 
enterprise “carried on to an unusual degree by persons engaged in continuing 
 
270  2016 CAREER OFFENDER REPORT, supra note 12, at 3. 
271  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
272  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).. 
273  “The term ‘controlled substance offense’ means an offense under federal or state law, 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, 
export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled 
substance . . . with the intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
274  To qualify as a career offender predicate, the prior felony conviction must be “a prior adult 
federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony and regardless of the 
actual sentence imposed.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) app. n.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).  
275  28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006). 
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patterns of criminal activity.”276 As with the BRA and the 1986 Act, Congress was 
once again in full War-on-Drugs mode—more focused on being “tough on crime” 
than on the practical consequences of requiring the Commission to set sentences for 
recidivist drug offenders at or near the statutory maximum. 
The Commission made things worse when it formulated the career offender 
guideline. It did not “follow the plain terms of this statutory directive” and has since 
“expanded the list of qualifying drug offenses by adding numerous state and federal 
drug offenses to those listed in § 994(h).”277 Moreover, by pegging the career 
offender guideline to the offense’s statutory maximum, the Commission did not 
consider whether the resulting sentences satisfied § 3553(a)’s purposes of 
punishment or the “parsimony provision.”278 Finally, because most drug offenses 
carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, people convicted of drug offenses 
often face much higher statutory maximum penalties than those who are convicted 
of violent offenses.279 For example, nearly 80% of “violent only”280 career offenders 
faced statutory maximums of less than 25 years, which bizarrely results in a lower 
offense level under the career offender guideline.281 
The Commission’s data demonstrate that the career offender guideline is overly 
severe, especially in drug cases. Not surprisingly, the career offender provision 
impacts people convicted of drug offenses most severely. Of the career offenders 
sentenced in Fiscal Year 2018, the overwhelming majority—78%—were convicted 
of drug offenses.282 In approximately 93% of these cases, the person’s career 
offender status increased their guideline range.283 Nearly 50% of career offenders 
saw an increase in both their final offense level and their CHC.284 As the 
Commission itself has observed, the career offender provision has “resulted in some 
of the most severe penalties imposed under the guidelines,”285 with “the greatest 
 
276  S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983). 
277  United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 971 (N.D. Iowa 2013)  (citing Amy Baron-
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279  2016 CAREER OFFENDER REPORT, supra note 12, at 31. 
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(2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_ 
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impact on the offenders in the drug trafficking only category.”286 Because their 
sentences are so lengthy, career offenders now account for over 11% of the total 
BOP population,287 even though career offender cases only constitute 2.5% of the 
federal sentencing docket.288 
The career offender guideline also results in disturbing racial disparities. The 
Sentencing Commission’s Fifteen Year Report highlighted the career offender 
guideline’s “unwarranted adverse impacts” on people of color. 289 In particular, the 
Fifteen Year Report found that Black people are more often subject “to the severe 
penalties required by the career offender guideline” than similarly-situated White 
people because of “the relative ease of detecting and prosecuting offenses that take 
place in open-air drug markets, which are most often found in impoverished minority 
neighborhoods.”290 That reality puts Black people at a “higher risk of conviction for 
a drug trafficking crime,”291 and makes them more likely to have drug convictions 
on their record in the first place. The statistics bear this out. In Fiscal Year 2018, 
61.6% of career offenders were Black.292 The Commission and the Supreme Court 
have recognized the pernicious effect of even the perception of sentencing disparities 
based on race, because it fosters “disrespect for and lack of confidence in the 
criminal justice system.”293 
The foregoing makes clear that judges should issue categorical policy 
disagreements with the career offender guideline for “drug trafficking only” career 
offenders, regardless of the mitigating or aggravating facts of the case. There are a 
number of evidence-based policy reasons judges can give for issuing below-
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293  Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 98 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
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First, the career offender guideline is not the product of “careful study, 
empirical research, or national experience.”294 Amy Baron-Evans, who was until 
recently the Federal Defender’s Chief Sentencing Resource Counsel, 
comprehensively “deconstructed” the numerous problems with the career offender 
guideline in a 2010 paper.295 The typical profile of a career offender is someone who 
commits a low-level federal drug offense and has two prior state convictions for 
minor drug offenses.296 Before the guidelines were enacted, a person with two prior 
drug offenses on his record who was charged federally with possessing with intent 
to distribute 50 grams of heroin would be facing 37 to 46 months.297 That is 
approximately the same sentence the person would face under the guidelines without 
application of the career offender provision.298 Under the career offender guideline, 
however, the person’s guideline range skyrockets to 210 to 262 months.299 Because 
Congress directed the Commission to set career offender guideline ranges at or near 
the statutory maximum, the Commission did not rely on pre-guidelines sentencing 
practices or employ an empirical approach when it formulated the career offender 
guideline.300 As a result, under Kimbrough’s rubric, the career offender guideline 
“cannot be assumed to be a ‘rough approximation’ . . . of § 3553(a)’s objectives.”301 
The guideline also “defines the class of career offenders . . . much more broadly than 
the statute requires.”302 In particular, it includes numerous drug offenses not listed 
in the relevant statute, providing only a “blanket post-hoc justification” for doing 
so.303 
Next, judges should account for the fact that the Commission now disagrees 
with applying the career offender guideline to people who are “drug trafficking 
only” career offenders and has recommended that Congress remove them from the 
relevant statute.304 In a 2016 report to Congress, the Commission concluded that the 
guideline should “differentiate between career offenders with different types of 
criminal records, and is best focused on those offenders who have committed at least 
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one ‘crime of violence.’”305 The Commission emphasized that reforming the career 
offender directive to exclude “drug trafficking” only career offenders “would help 
ensure that federal sentences better account for the severity of the offenders’ prior 
records, protect the public, and avoid undue severity for certain less culpable 
offenders.”306 
In its report, the Commission acknowledged several additional problems with 
the career offender guideline. First, it pegs punishment to the offense’s statutory 
maximum, which can lead to absurd results.307 For most federal drug offenses, the 
statutory maximum—determined by the 1986 Act—is life in prison.308 As a result, 
“[c]ontrary to what might be expected,” the career offender guideline has “a 
significantly greater sentencing impact” on drug-trafficking only career offenders 
because drug offenses have much higher statutory maximum penalties than many 
violent offenses.309 For example, people who are convicted under the “primary drug 
trafficking statute”—21 U.S.C. § 841—face a statutory maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment, which correlates with the highest possible career offender offense 
level under the guidelines—level 37.310 Coupled with Criminal History Category VI 
and without any departures and adjustments, that yields a guideline range of 36 years 
to life.311 On the flip side, the federal offense of robbery—also a career offender 
predicate—has a statutory maximum penalty of 20 years and therefore the career 
offender offense level is 32 under the guidelines and the resulting guideline range is 
210 to 262 months.312 This result makes no sense. Second, the Commission found 
that “drug trafficking only” career offenders are not “meaningfully different” from 
other people convicted of federal drug offenses who are sentenced under the drug 
guidelines.313 Thus, they should not “categorically be subject to the significant 
increases in penalties required by the career offender directive.”314 One example of 
this is that “drug trafficking only” career offenders recidivate at a lower rate than 
 
305  Id. 
306  Id. 
307  Id.  
308  See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1986)). 
309  Amy Baron-Evans et al., supra note 294, at 47.  
310  2016 CAREER OFFENDER REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.  
311  See id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, SENTENCING TABLE (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018).  
312  2016 CAREER OFFENDER REPORT, supra note 12, at 8; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 4B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 
SENTENCING TABLE (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).  
313  2016 CAREER OFFENDER REPORT, supra note 12, at 27. 
314  Id.  
2020  FED. JUD. DRUG LAW REF. ERA OF CONG. DYS. 327 
career offenders who are charged with a “crime of violence” or have such an offense 
on their record.315 
The Commission did not make its recommendation lightly. Its exhaustive 64-
page report analyzed data and incorporated feedback from judges, practitioners, 
academics, and other interest groups.316 The report was sparked in part by “growing 
criticisms” about the career offender guideline and the resulting “overly severe 
penalties” for certain career offenders, which led to “increased departures and 
variances from the guidelines.”317 As an example, in United States v. Newhouse, the 
district court sentenced a “drug trafficking only” career offender to a greatly-reduced 
sentence, explaining in a written opinion that the guideline range went from 70 to 
87 months to “a staggering and mind-numbing 262 to 327 months” on the basis of 
two prior drug convictions that arose out of a single drug raid.318 This is exactly the 
sort of judicial feedback loop that the Supreme Court envisioned in Rita.319 
After the report, judges find themselves in a “space in which the Commission 
disagrees with its own Guidelines as applied” for “drug trafficking only” career 
offenders, with no timeline for when Congress might act on the Commission’s 
reform recommendation.320 Legislators need to hear from judges. So far, judges’ 
criticisms of the career offender guideline in “drug trafficking only” cases have 
largely focused on its application in an individual case,321 with some also 
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acknowledging “a quasi-categorical policy disagreement with it when applied to 
low-level, non-violent drug addicts.”322  
Judges’ criticisms up to this point fall short and understate the problems with 
the career offender guideline. Judges should not be imposing high sentences under 
a guideline with which the Commission itself disagrees. Instead, judges should 
categorically reject the career offender guideline in all “drug trafficking only” career 
offender cases on policy grounds, before turning to an individualized analysis of the 
§ 3553(a) factors. More specifically, judges should take the following steps at 
sentencing: (1) calculate the guidelines applying the career offender provision, to 
comply with Booker and its progeny; (2) lodge a categorical policy disagreement 
with the career offender guideline, citing the Commission’s 2016 Report; (3) 
calculate the guidelines that would apply notwithstanding the career offender 
guideline; and (4) analyze the § 3553(a) factors to reach a sentence that is “sufficient, 
but not greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes of sentencing.323 Judges 
should then explain the rationale for their policy disagreement in a written opinion 





Given that Congress is perennially mired in tough-on-crime politics, 
substantive federal drug law reform is highly unlikely for the foreseeable future. 
Federal judges must not wait for Congress to change the law. Instead, judges must 
acknowledge that the federal drug laws were enacted at the height of the War on 
Drugs, have led to significant racial disparities, and have contributed to the mass 
incarceration of people of color. In light of these realities, judges should use the 
substantial discretion vested in them to promote reform at both ends of the detention 
crisis, at bail and at sentencing. Judges should release more people on bail, reduce 
more sentences based on categorical disagreements with the drug guidelines and the 
career offender guideline, and write more opinions on these pivotal issues. If judges 
use their discretion in this way they can reduce racial disparities, ameliorate mass 
incarceration, and perhaps even prompt Congress to take more decisive action.  
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